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Lutherans and Human Sexuality
Purpose Statement   | This publication is by and largely for the academic communities of the 
twenty-eight colleges and universities of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. It is published by the Vocation and 
Education unit of the ELCA. The publication has its home at Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois, which has gener-
ously offered leadership and physical and financial support as an institutional sponsor for the publication. 
The ELCA has frequently sponsored conferences for faculty and administrators that have addressed the church-college/
university partnership. The ELCA has sponsored an annual Vocation of the Lutheran College Conference. The primary 
purpose of Intersections is to enhance and continue such dialogue. It will do so by:
• Lifting up the vocation of Lutheran colleges and universities
• Encouraging thoughtful dialogue about the partnership of colleges and universities with the church
• Offering a forum for concerns and interests of faculty at the intersection of faith, learning, and teaching
• Raising for debate issues about institutional missions, goals, objectives, and learning priorities
• Encouraging critical and productive discussion on our campuses of issues focal to the life of the church
• Serving as a bulletin board for communications among institutions and faculties
• Publishing papers presented at conferences sponsored by the ELCA and its institutions
• Raising the level of awareness among faculty about the Lutheran heritage and connectedness of their institutions, 
realizing a sense of being part of a larger family with common interests and concerns.
From the Publisher   | I am really looking forward to holding this issue of Intersections in my 
hands. The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) as a church body is still a teenager; it was established in 
1987-88. The journal Intersections is even younger. It has been published by the ELCA Division for Higher Education and 
Schools (DHES) since 1996, so it is only ten years old. But both the church body and the journal have gone through major 
changes this year.  
The ELCA has gone through restructuring. The DHES no longer exists. The work for the church and the colleges and 
universities that are related to the ELCA continues almost as before, but it is now done within the Educational Partnerships 
and Institutions (EPI) group within the unit for Vocation and Education (VE). So even though those who work with the 
colleges and universities do the same work as before, we have new colleagues, new bosses, a new set of budget codes, and as 
you can see above, a whole new set of acronyms. Soon we will also have new offices on a different floor of the Chicago build-
ing where the churchwide offices are located.
Intersections has a new editor, Robert Haak, is located at a new college, uses a new printing firm, and has a new design 
and layout. This issue is devoted to one of the most important issues that the ELCA is dealing with right now, human sexu-
ality. Many of us hate to talk about and read about sexuality, because it used to be a taboo topic, and because so many people 
have such strong opinions about it that no matter what we say or do we may offend. But a church that serves the needs of its 
members and the needs of this society must deal with it, and so I am glad that the ELCA is developing a social statement on 
sexuality, just as it is developing a social statement on education.
The first draft of Our Calling in Education: A First Draft of a Social Statement (2006) has now been distributed  
for discussion and comments. A copy may be requested from 1-800-638-3522, extension 2966, or downloaded from  
www.elca.org/socialstatements/education. The Task Force on Education would like to receive your comments no later 
than October 15, 2006, so they can consider them as they prepare the next draft for discussion and action at the ELCA 
Churchwide Assembly in 2007. 
Living in God’s Amazing Grace,
ARnE SELByg | Director for Colleges and Universities 
 2 |  Intersections  |  Spring 2006
Contents  number 22 | Spring 2006
4 
From the Editor | ROBERT D. HAAk
6 
A Church, the Human Condition, and the Fissured  
Face of Peace | D. M. yEAgER
16 
Sexuality over the Lifespan—Social Trends Pose Moral  
Dilemmas for Communities of Faith | ADInA nACk
21 
Ethical Deliberation and the Biblical Text—A Lutheran  
Contribution to Reading the Bible | RITVA WILLIAMS
26 
Scarred Epistemologies: What a Theology of the Cross Has  
to Say about the gay Marriage Ban | JACQUELInE BUSSIE
34 
What Could the Lutheran Colleges and Universities  
Contribute to the ELCA Discussion of Sexuality—But  
What Would They Actually Contribute? | ROBERT BEnnE
intersections 
Arne Selbyg | publisher
Robert D. Haak | editor
Alyssa Bevans | student   
editorial assistant
Laura O’Melia | secretary 
published by
The Vocation and Education Unit | The 





Rock Island, Illinois USA 61201-2296
editorial board
Timothy A. Bennett  | wittenberg 
university
karla Bohmbach | susquehanna  
university
DeAne Lagerquist | st. olaf college
Victoria Horst  | newberry college
on the cover
Reproduction of the image Hommage à 
Apollinaire, 1911-1912 by Marc Chagall. 
Courtesy of Van Abbe Museum, The 
netherlands
3
From the Editor   | ROBERT D. HAAk
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TOM CHRISTEnSOn BEgAn his introduction to the last 
issue by asking what adjective should be used to describe that 
issue. That also seems like an appropriate question to begin 
my introduction to this Spring 2006 issue. Some of you who 
pay particular attention to the arrival of Intersections in your 
mailbox will answer that the most fitting adjective will be 
“late.”  There is truth in this description. As is often the case, 
when I inherited the editing duties for this journal from Tom 
Christenson, I misjudged the complexity of the task (and maybe 
also my own resources!). I hope that those of you who have been 
patiently waiting will find that the result was worth the wait.
My own preferred adjective would be “new” (we will have to wait 
to decide whether “and improved” should be added to the phrase).  
The journal has a new look and feel. We hope that the changes will 
enhance its readability and “eye appeal.” We are coming to you from 
a new place—Augustana College in Rock Island, Illinois. I would 
like to thank Augustana for its commitment to and support of this 
project. I hope that you will find some of the ideas in this issue new  
as well.
As is announced on the cover page, the theme of this issue is 
“Lutherans and Human Sexuality.” I have to admit that growing 
up it never would have occurred to me that these two concepts 
belonged together. I imagine there are some readers out there 
who still feel this way. But, as Lutherans, it seems that we ought 
to have something valuable to say about such an important 
topic. The need to continue (or begin?) discussions was made 
clear by the controversies swirling around the votes taken at the 
Churchwide Assembly in Orlando last summer. While it is clear 
that some members of the ELCA hope the Orlando resolutions 
will be the last words on such topics, the continuing work of the 
Task Force for ELCA Studies on Sexuality and the report they 
will issue mean that the conversations are just beginning.  This is 
especially true as we begin to talk about the much broader issues 
of human sexuality. 
The question that I asked in putting together this issue was 
“what might ELCA colleges be able to contribute to the conver-
sations about human sexuality?” Each of the articles in this issue 
gives a part of an answer to this question. yeager calls on the col-
leges to educate in a way that will create the sort of community 
that can have these sorts of conversations and still remain a com-
munity. Colleges might well be models of this discourse. Benne 
ends with a similar thought but doubts that Lutheran colleges 
will be able to be the sort of place where this will happen. He 
concludes with a challenge to the colleges and universities to 
gather and to put into action the sort of conversations that they 
claim are at the heart of their identity.
In between these two calls for conversation we find the con-
versation modeled by Williams and Bussie. Williams proposes a 
model for how Lutherans might use the biblical text to inform 
the conversations that take place. She terms this a “critical 
traditionalist hermeneutic.” Bussie proposes that the Lutheran 
confessions and Lutheran theology also can provide resources 
for this conversation. 
While much of the conversation to this point has centered 
on the understanding of same sex relationships, nack reminds 
us that the range of questions dealing with sexuality (Lutheran 
and non-Lutheran) is much broader than this question. Pastors 
and parishioners and college faculty and others are all faced 
with a wide range of ethical and social issues surrounding the 
understanding of human sexuality. One of the questions that 
I asked when beginning to think about these issues was what 
the data told us about the sexual activities and understandings 
of Lutheran college students today. My experience as a college 
teacher over the last twenty years seemed to indicate to me 
that sexuality was an issue that was fairly high on the list of 
“interesting topics” for my students. When checking into what 
we know about “sex and the Lutheran college student,” I was a 
bit shocked to find out that we really don’t know much about 
the topic. Our college students are surveyed on a wide range of 
subjects, but (maybe not too surprisingly) their sexual attitudes 
have not been an area of exploration. It may be that collecting 
some relevant data to inform the discussion is something that 
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the conversation.
In order to begin to fill the void, I asked the folks who con-
ducted the national Study of youth and Religion (http://www.
youthandreligion.org) if they had data specifically on sexuality 
and Lutheran students. The answer came back that no one had 
ever asked the question before. That in itself is an interesting 
fact. I asked them to determine if there was enough data in 
their set to be able to say anything significant specifically about 
Lutheran youth. They found the following facts in their survey.1
• nearly 43% of Lutheran teens do not necessarily believe 
that people should wait for marriage to have sex. (About 
the same percentage as for the total sample of teens 
sampled.)
• 68% of the ELCA teens would consider living with a 
partner to whom they were not married.
• nearly 24% of Lutheran teens have engaged in oral sex. 
(Slightly higher than the total sample. Over 8% of the 
Lutherans had engaged in oral sex before age 15.)
• Over 16% of Lutheran teens have had sexual intercourse.
• Almost 80% of the Lutheran teens who had intercourse 
used protection.
• Over 90% of those Lutheran teens who had intercourse 
were not under the influence of alcohol or drugs during 
their first experience.
• More than 18% of Lutheran teens never attend church.
• More than 57% of Lutheran teens attend church more 
than a few times a year.
• Of this last group, 25% of the ELCA teens report that the 
church has done nothing to help them with their sexuality.
This might be the beginning of a conversation that seems to 
be very important to Lutheran teens—and probably to all of us. 
If 25% of these teens feel that the church has nothing helpful to 
say to them in this conversation, it seems that there is consider-
able room for improvement. Many questions remain. Would a 
larger data base result in significantly different results? What 
other questions could we ask with a larger sample? What are the 
important questions that need to be asked?
With yeager and Benne, I would like to see what ELCA 
colleges and universities could add to the conversation about 
important issues facing the church and our communities. These 
conversations are also important for our own understanding of 
our role as “Lutheran colleges,” not colleges isolated from the 
communities in which they exist.  
I would like to thank Arne Selbyg, Director for Colleges and 
Universities and the Vocation and Education program unit for 
the chance to make a contribution to the ongoing conversations 
about the nature of Lutheran colleges. I would also like to thank 
Tom Christenson for all the assistance he has given in making 
the transition to this “new” journal a smooth one. I would ask 
each of you who read and value Intersections to consider submit-
ting your thoughts for perusal by your colleagues. Please send 
any submissions (preferably in electronic MLA format) to me 
at avrbh@augustana.edu. I look forward to the continuation of 
this work!
ROBERT D. HAAk | The Augustana Center for Vocational
Reflection, Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois
Endnotes
1. These results were reported to me on 4/5/2006 based on the 
analysis of kyle Longest who works for the national Study of youth 
and Religion.  “Lutheran teens” for the purposes of this study are 
defined as teens whose parents identified themselves as Lutheran.  They 
are not necessarily teens who attend Lutheran colleges and universities.  
The total number of “Lutheran teens” was 135.  The number of “ELCA 
Lutheran teens” was 50.  This is a relatively small number within the 
total survey.  While it might be hoped that a larger sample could be 
examined, this is the best that I could find at this point.  Have any  
of the faculty at any of our colleges asked these sorts of questions of 
their students?
In JAnUARy 2005, after nearly three years of work, the Task 
Force for ELCA Studies on Sexuality released its report and its 
three recommendations concerning the church’s policies relat-
ing to same-sex couples. From this report, the Church Council 
developed three resolutions, which were made public in April; 
two of these matched the recommendations of the task force, 
but the third differed. In August the Churchwide Assembly 
acted on these resolutions and the multiple amendments and 
substitute motions that were proposed from the floor. The first 
two resolutions were affirmed by the Assembly (the second with 
an amendment of wording, the effect of which was variously 
interpreted); the third was defeated, as were all of the substitute 
motions advanced by voting members. These dry facts give no 
hint of the turmoil, at the level of both intellectual exchange 
and practical maneuvering, that has characterized the ELCA 
since the 2001 Churchwide Assembly placed these disputes 
near the top of the agenda of our church. As a member of that 
task force, I have been invited to reflect on what “lessons for 
the church’s educational mission” might be derived from this 
experience. Perhaps counterintuitively, I would like to focus on 
what might be learned about peace. 
If furthering “peace in all the world” is part of the mission 
of the church, then it is also the mission of Lutheran colleges 
and universities. We all, I suspect, carry around in our minds 
some very sentimental and romanticized notions of peace, 
notions that make it difficult to imagine that the controversy, 
anger, and alienation swirling around Lutheran teachings and 
policies relating to same-sex couples could be at all relevant to a 
ministry of peace, except as exemplifying its absence. yet if we 
equate peace with the absence of disagreement, then truly there 
could be no peace, and all efforts to promote it would be futile. 
I would like to propose that we try, inspired by this passage 
D. M. yEAgER is Associate Professor of Theology at Georgetown University and a member of the Task Force for ELCA Studies on Sexuality.
D. M. YEagEr
A Church, the Human Condition,  
and the Fissured Face of Peace1 
But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near by the blood of Christ. For 
he is our peace; in his flesh he has made both groups into one and has broken down the dividing wall, 
that is, the hostility between us.
—Ephesians 2:13, 14
To fulfill these purposes, this church shall: . . . Study social issues and trends, work to discover 
the causes of oppression and injustice, and develop programs of ministry and advocacy to further 
human dignity, freedom, justice, and peace in all the world.
—ELCA Constitution, sec. 4.03.1
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from Ephesians, to equate peace, instead, with the absence of 
hostility and violence (and that we construe “violence” broadly 
as coercive force). Margaret Payne and James Childs quoted this 
scriptural text at the end of the letter with which they submitted 
the task force recommendations to the Church Council. Above 
their signatures, the letter closed, “In Christ’s peace.”
My theme, then, is “the fissured face of peace”—and by this 
I mean to invoke a rock face that is cleft, cracked, and broken. I 
dislike postmodern jargon, but “fissured” is one of the terms that 
I have found very helpful. “Fissures” point to contradictions, 
silences, disconnects, discontinuities, conflicts, and disagree-
ments; but the important thing about fissures is that they do not 
go all the way through whatever medium (face) they disrupt.
When the task force was created, many expected—or at least 
hoped—that it would, by diligent and careful study, listen-
ing, and reasoning, produce peace in the church by supplying 
final and definitive answers to the questions at the heart of the 
controversy. The church longed for the restoration of tranquility 
and appointed a task force to achieve that. not surprisingly, in 
the months after the task force report became public, consider-
able disappointment and criticism were voiced because the task 
force had not “settled the question.” In the first part of this 
article, I will review why the task force did not do what many 
had expected. The factors that account for the course the task 
force pursued involve us in reflection on the nature of moral 
controversies, the inevitability of change, and the ways in which 
communities undertake to deal with controversies, dissent, and 
challenges to received tradition and authority. While we may 
wish to think about all of these things in ways that draw upon 
the Christian and Lutheran understanding of our situation 
before god and before one another, we cannot think about 
them in isolation from a well-grounded understanding of the 
human condition, or the realities of (fallen) creation. To be 
careless on this point in our pursuit of peace is to end up chasing 
after some invention of our dreams. In the second section, then, 
I will draw upon Hannah Arendt’s incisive description of the 
human condition to highlight some of these indelible features of 
our creaturely being, and in the last section I will suggest some 
ways in which a deep and reverent understanding of the human 
condition might be accented in our colleges and universities, 
with the hope of enabling our graduates to disagree without 
hostility, to evaluate without hatred or condescension, to engage 
change in positive and constructive ways, and to embrace in 
hope and courage the difficult work of making our views more 
true, our judgments more reliable, and our institutions more 
humane and just.
Reasons for not “settling the question”
It is probably fair to say that the report pleased no one. Those 
who were not particularly invested in these questions either way 
were discouraged and disappointed to find that no final word had 
been spoken to end what has developed into a bitter controversy. 
They had been hopeful that there would be a definitive resolution 
one way or another that would, as they often put it, allow the 
church to “move on” and redirect its energy and passion toward 
other urgent concerns such as economic justice, the deteriorat-
ing situations in the Middle East and the Sudan, the health-care 
challenges we face in the United States, hunger and homelessness 
in our own country and in the world, and ecological degradation. 
The task force had been appointed to produce clarity and end a 
squabble, and since, as a practical matter, we did not do that, they 
judged that we had failed to fulfill the charge we were given.
Others saw the failure as a moral and theological one. To 
them, the report had the look of moral spinelessness—and it 
looked that way both to those who had hoped that the task 
force would affirm the existing policies and support their 
enforcement, and to those who had hoped that the task force 
would recommend revising those policies in the name of justice. 
In a list-serve e-mail released January 14, 2005 (the day after 
the report and recommendations were made public), Roy A. 
Harrisville III, Executive Director of Solid Rock Lutherans, 
condemned the report for failing to “reflect both the bibli-
cal faith of millions and the desire for a clear word from our 
Church leadership.” Focusing on the third recommendation, he 
wrote, “With this recommendation, the Task Force has stated 
that sexual boundaries do not matter now, if they ever did.” 
From the other side, our work was faulted for elevating church 
unity over both truth and justice. Larry Rasmussen, a Lutheran 
ethicist writing in The Network Letter, was particularly force-
ful in his criticism on this point. The outcome of years of work 
by the task force was marked by an “absence of the spirit and 
courage of a church of the Reformation” (4). noting Luther’s 
own confidence that “the living, active Word of god that suf-
fuses all creation can and might bring us all to a new place, as a 
church ever in need of reform,” he complained that “the daring, 
the venturesomeness, and the creativity that mark this joyful 
dynamic of Reformation freedom seem hedged about on every 
side in the Task Force report” (4). The task force had, in his view, 
“compromised the reformation” and “miss[ed] the chance to be 
Lutheran” (4, 5).
Lost in sin as we all are, it is more than possible that some 
or all of these negative assessments are accurate. Still, I cannot 
escape the sense that most of what has been written and said 
about our report fails to appreciate what may have been its most 
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important contribution: its effort to give substance and meaning 
to the notion of the church as a community of moral delibera-
tion. Of course, it is possible that we failed at that too, but that  
is a conversation that is still waiting to happen.
Moral judgments, moral conflicts
Moral conflicts arise out of the nature of moral judgment. All 
knowledge claims involve interpretation and judgment, even 
simple descriptions of fact and even empirical, scientific find-
ings. The role of judgment, or what Michael Polanyi calls the 
personal coefficient of knowledge, is more obvious and more 
dominant in the domains of religion, philosophy, and ethics than 
in other spheres of human inquiry and conviction. All judgments 
are subject to dispute by others who judge differently, but such 
contestations are much more widespread in moral and religious 
matters because (1) the realities in question are complex, difficult 
to isolate, and comparatively elusive; (2) more people feel that 
they know enough, on the basis of their own experience, to speak 
out with an authoritative voice; and (3) the issues at stake cut so 
incisively into their own action, self-understanding, and inter-
ests that people feel compelled by reason of their own integrity 
to defend their views and convictions. The important thing to 
understand here is that no amount of goodwill or education is 
going to banish moral and religious disagreement.
yet not all moral conflicts are alike. Conflicts arise for differ-
ent reasons and the differences in cause have important implica-
tions for how, and even whether, the disagreement can be resolved.
1.  Some arise from inadequate understanding of the situation or 
defective reasoning about the situation. Conflicts of this sort 
are usually able to be resolved through education and careful 
critical analysis of the arguments offered by the opposing 
sides. Fortunately, the majority of our disagreements (moral 
and otherwise) are probably of this sort.
2.  Some arise because of deeper conflicts about underlying 
issues. These are harder to resolve because parties to the con-
flict first have to be brought to see that the ostensible subject 
of disagreement is not the actual subject of disagreement, and 
they then have to be willing to engage the conversation at the 
proper level.
3.  Some arise out of divergent judgments about the relative 
weight (or the proper ordering and balancing) of compet-
ing high-level values. Disputes of this kind can be impos-
sible to resolve (centuries of disagreement between pacifist 
Christians and Christians who condone the carefully 
regulated use of fatal force provide a familiar example here).
4.  Some arise from divergent styles of moral reasoning. Here 
we might think of conflicts between ethicists who reason 
primarily in terms of goals or ends and ethicists who reason 
primarily from prima facie duties.2  Or we might think of 
ethicists who start with Scripture and ask how it applies to 
experience and ethicists who begin with experience and ask 
how Scripture illuminates experience.
5.  Some, it must be admitted, arise from sin, pride, sloth, 
bigotry, self-indulgence, and other forms of self-centeredness, 
viciousness, or bad faith.
In the discussion that follows, I am going to disallow appeal 
to the fifth reason as a way of accounting for our current dis-
putes—though I notice that many people do appeal precisely to 
this explanation. I disallow it because (1) my own observations 
do not support it and (2) Christian charity requires that we put 
the best possible construction on the arguments of others.
The widespread disappointment reflects the fact that people 
thought this controversy was of the first variety—that it was a 
problem that could be resolved by concentrated study that would 
reveal what the church ought to do. I thought that myself when 
I began the work. But greater understanding has not yielded a 
resolution of this conflict; it actually seems sometimes to deepen 
the disagreement. Reflecting in his February 2005 newsletter 
on “What We’ve Learned about Ourselves” as a result of the 
years of study, Bishop Theodore Schneider noted that “there was 
a strong belief and hope across the church that if we all shared 
the same information we would be able to come to a consensus 
of agreement. Simply put, the problem was thought to be one of 
education.” The massive study efforts were not without effect. 
“We have learned a great deal about one another and, I believe, 
have come to a new appreciation of one another. But it does not 
appear that many minds were changed, just as the same appears 
to have been true on the Task Force itself.” And so, he concludes, 
another thing that “we have already learned is this: We may well 
live ourselves into change in this church and in our society, but 
we shall never argue ourselves into it” (2).
While study and education are hardly useless in the present 
case, it has become apparent that this controversy has deep and 
various roots, not all of which are actually ethical. I happen to 
have concluded that the controversy is primarily a controversy 
of the second sort and that the underlying issues are not actually 
moral or ethical at all, but for purposes of this article, it is not 
important whether the controversy is of the second, third, or 
fourth type. Whichever of these types it is, it is not a contro-
versy that a task force can “settle” for the church. This is partly 
because such conflicts sometimes do end at an impasse, but it is 
mostly because where such deep and responsible disagreements 
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arise, the church, as a whole community, must struggle toward 
a resolution. It cannot delegate that work to some subsidiary 
agency in the way that the work of study or fact-finding can be 
delegated. It was thus the considered judgment of the task force 
that time, forbearance, and widespread conversation would be 
required for this process to be carried through successfully—if 
it can be carried through at all. That was why we began by 
recommending that our church “concentrate on finding ways to 
live together faithfully in the midst of our disagreements.” Our 
second and third recommendations were offered as suggestions 
as to how the church might conduct itself as that continuing 
conversation unfolds.
Communities and their conflicts
Our recommendations notwithstanding, it is obvious that a 
number of different courses are open to a community when 
education and logical argument fail to persuade and produce 
one-mindedness or consensus. not all of them are mutually 
exclusive, but only two of them seem conducive to the continu-
ing dialogue and mutual discernment that distinguish a com-
munity of moral deliberation.
The most typical response is probably the determination 
to overcome dissent by an exercise of power. It is possible (and 
sometimes, for the common good, necessary) to compel obedi-
ence where agreement cannot be won by argument. Whether the 
obedience one is compelling is obedience to traditional author-
ity, the law of the land, the will of a powerful elite, or the will 
of a voting majority, the method of resolution is the same. It is 
certainly the case that human communities cannot get on in an 
orderly way without such recourse to the exercise of power, but 
it does not follow that all fractious disagreements are best dealt 
with in this way. A defeated but unpersuaded faction can remain 
a source of significant discord. Moreover, in voluntary associa-
tions, compelling people to do things can get a little tricky. 
People are, after all, free to leave, and they often do.
Consequently, a true and final division of the house is 
another way of coping with deep and abiding disagreement. 
From its first meeting, the task force has been acutely aware that 
a significant number of current ELCA members believe that 
if other members cannot be brought to see moral truth as they 
do, the appropriate outcome would be the separation of ELCA 
Lutherans into smaller church bodies that are each more uni-
formly like-minded. If their interpretations and judgments do 
not prevail, those who believe that Scripture demands the affir-
mation and rigorous enforcement of current teachings and poli-
cies pertaining to sexual conduct appear to be prepared to leave 
the ELCA in order to form their own church. Should this occur, 
the congregations electing to remain identified as the ELCA 
would also constitute a more homogeneous church. In practice, 
this sort of redrawing of system boundaries is a common way 
of addressing intractable disputes in voluntary organizations, 
and in practice, this resolution often follows attempts to resolve 
disputes by an exercise of power. Of course, it should not be 
overlooked that an announcement by part of a community that 
they are moving toward separation is itself a fairly muscular exer-
cise of power. neither should it be overlooked that “church shop-
ping” and the transition from “churched” to “unchurched” are 
other manifestations of this same phenomenon. Such maneuvers 
often seem more oriented toward comfort than toward peace 
(as the bitterness and disdain that afflict the newly established 
boundaries make plain). More importantly, if we habitually dis-
sociate ourselves from people who see things differently, we may 
actually diminish any possibility of rendering our views more 
nearly true.
In the face of conflict, some members of a community may 
respond by trying to de-escalate the issue, recasting it as one that 
does not matter, or at least does not matter as much as (or in the 
way that) others in the community think it does. On its surface, 
this may seem like an irresponsible or even malicious technique 
for buying peace by trivialization. yet when bitter controversies 
are fed (intentionally or unintentionally) by incendiary rhetoric, 
false dichotomies, misrepresentation of contending arguments, 
and unrelenting focus on worst-case scenarios, it can be a work 
of grace to try to enhance the community’s sense of balance and 
proportion. Such efforts represent something quite different 
from relativistic laissez-faire, nor do they entail any abdication 
of principle. They are, on the contrary, strategies that may be 
essential to the restoration of the degree of community necessary 
to allow honest and principled moral deliberation.
It is also open to a community to intentionally choose to 
accommodate legitimate divergence (by which I mean well-
grounded, well-informed, principled disagreement) in order 
to continue together in conversation in the hope (perhaps only 
eschatological) that we may come to find some common ground. 
The period of accommodation may be comparatively brief and 
transitional or it may last for centuries. When Luther nailed his 
theses to the door, he was not proposing to split the community; 
he was inviting the community to talk together about difficult 
and contentious issues—to recognize its own divisions and try 
together to separate correctable corruption from legitimate 
dispute. The history of the Reformation and its aftermath 
teaches us how alien to human nature and to the infrastructure 
of human organizations this notion of accommodative, delibera-
tive peace actually is. On the Christian biblical understanding, 
peace is not, as John Macquarrie points out, a normative, static 
condition that is, from time to time, regrettably disrupted by 
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troublers of the communal equilibrium; rather, “peace is … a 
process and a task as man moves from potentiality to realiza-
tion” (19). Reflecting on Eph. 2:13, he continues, “When Christ 
bequeathed the gift of peace to his followers and when as the 
climax of the beatitudes he commended the peacemakers, we 
can see in retrospect that this was not the promise of tranquillity 
but the invitation to continue a costly work” (22). The work of 
peace is the work of reconciliation.
The task force, as a microcosm of our church, could have, 
after all its study, listening, and argument, tried to “settle the 
question” by taking a vote and declaring the majority victori-
ous and the majority’s views true. The task force did not do this, 
and in retrospect I have come to think that that was our most 
important contribution. I can make some guesses as to how such 
a vote would have turned out, but I truly do not know—because 
we never took it. We declined to exercise majority power out 
of respect for the conscience of those who, by reason of convic-
tion and integrity, found themselves to be of different minds. 
In offering our church the report and recommendations that 
we offered, the task force modeled its belief that we are a com-
munity, and that communities (1) should seek to operate by 
consensus and (2) in the absence of consensus, do best if they 
acknowledge and accommodate their conflicts rather than either 
denying them or allowing them to flare into feuds. 
Re-formation
Just as it is important not to identify peace with the absence of 
conflict, so it is important not to equate peace with stasis. We 
(the task force and the church at large) are in medias res—some-
where in the midst of one strand of the great, complex evolu-
tionary process of being the church under the call of a living 
god who moves and acts in history. This is always the case; the 
current situation simply highlights this for us.
I have heard many people frame the problem in terms of 
whether or not the church should change. The question is 
not whether to change, but how to change. Even if the 2005 
Churchwide Assembly had voted by an overwhelming majority to 
affirm existing teachings, practices, and policies and to uniformly 
enforce existing policies regarding lesbian and gay rostered 
ministers, the church would have changed. It would have become 
a church that, having scrutinized these teachings and all the 
reasons that people give for disagreeing with these teachings, had 
reaffirmed the teachings and policies in the face of that challenge 
and without concession to it. It would, by its very intentional 
act of reaffirming its received teachings, have become a church 
different from the church of thirty to fifty years ago in which the 
question simply did not come up because homosexual orientation 
was not acknowledged and same-sex couples were invisible.
Change can be good, neutral, or bad. Moreover, it can be 
all three at once—not just because different observers view it 
differently, but because the actual costs, burdens, and benefits 
of change fall differently on different sectors of a community 
and on different individuals. Change can be slow or rapid. Some 
favor slow change; others favor rapid change. The more one has 
invested in existing arrangements, the more one favors stability 
and (if change cannot be avoided) slow or evolutionary change—
thus, people often become more averse to change as they age, 
while the young sometimes seem to specialize in rebellion. There 
are many other good reasons not to proceed precipitously (not 
least among them the fallibility of human judgments about the 
right and the good), and institutional churches (as contrasted 
with more volatile and ephemeral religious movements) tend 
to move very deliberately. nonetheless, it is worth noting that 
highly significant changes often occur long before they are 
acknowledged, producing a kind of institutional cognitive dis-
sonance or even something close to unintentional hypocrisy.
Social systems are extremely complex, and the impetus 
toward change tends to arise not from within a single compo-
nent of a given system but from the friction between systems, 
between a comprehensive system and one or more internal 
subsystems, or between subsystems within a comprehensive 
system. Moreover, systems tend to have porous rather than rigid 
boundaries, and people tend to be “resourced” by more than 
one system (that is, we all participate in multiple social systems 
and subsystems). Consequently, communal life and organiza-
tional systems are not characterized by unanimous agreement. 
The affective bonds of loyalty and need are probably at least as 
important in maintaining a cohesive social system as the bonds 
arising from cognitive agreement. yet in strong and durable 
communities, there tends to be a strong, rich, and comparatively 
comprehensive consensus (though this consensus ought prob-
ably to be thought about more on the model of what we might 
call family relationships rather than on the model of universal 
accord on a few central beliefs).3
“Consensus” is a hard word to define, but it is pretty clear 
that our church, considered nationally and considered particu-
larly in light of the recorded votes of the Assembly, no longer 
has a strong consensus on the particular matter of just treatment 
of Lutheran same-sex couples in monogamous lifelong relation-
ships. Some on the task force felt that there is no emerging con-
sensus either. I, in contrast, suspect (partly on the basis of those 
votes at Churchwide Assembly4) that we are in fact seeing the 
slow emergence of a new consensus, but if so, it is still years away. 
In a just community, punishment of behaviors has to be backed 
and legitimated by strong consensus as to the unacceptability of 
the behavior in question; otherwise, the sanctions will seem to 
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many to be arbitrary, unfair, and discriminatory. In the absence 
of consensus, the task force recommended that policy should 
not be altered (implicitly, but not explicitly, acknowledging that 
policy alteration should reflect consensus in the community). 
However, the task force paired that respect for existing policy 
with recommendations that this church (1) undertake the kind 
of continuing dialogue that would allow either the emergence of 
a new consensus or a “repristinization” of the old consensus and 
(2) in the interim practice prudential deference and forbearance 
in the enforcement of policies that came about under a consen-
sus that no longer exists.
To the extent that ethics, policy, and leadership are always 
most fundamentally “about” the management of change, they 
demand great wisdom and discernment in differentiating among 
(1) what needs to be protected and preserved for the good of 
our common life, (2) what needs to be adapted or reinterpreted 
or renewed or reformed, and (3) what can be or needs to be 
relinquished or actively repudiated. As we have seen, the report 
and recommendations of the task force were bound to disap-
point those who considered the controversy to be resolvable 
by careful study. However, if one thinks instead that the task 
force was called to assist the church in addressing change and in 
responding as Lutherans to conscientious and principled dissent, 
the report and recommendations will seem, not necessarily more 
satisfying, but less like a default or evasion. In Journey Together 
Faithfully, Part 2, the task force exposed the degree to which 
the church itself has already changed by displaying the range of 
views held by faithful Lutherans—a portrait of the church that 
was validated many times over by the debate and actions of the 
Assembly. The recommendations themselves were built upon the 
belief of the task force that we, as a church, are not at this time 
able to clearly discern, with respect to this particular issue, what 
needs to be protected and preserved, what needs to be renewed 
or reformed, and what ought to be relinquished. Rather than 
urging false closure, the task force urged continuing conversa-
tion in which all voices will be heard.
Features of the human condition
In speaking about judgment, about change and temporality, 
and about the nature of social systems, I have already begun 
the exploration of our situation as creaturely beings, but to 
this I now want to add some specific insights from the work of 
Hannah Arendt. In The Human Condition, first published in 
1958 and continuously in print ever since, she begins with the 
indisputable observation that human beings are conditioned 
creatures; that is, we are the sort of creatures that exist in an 
environment on which we are dependent for our existence as 
the sort of creatures that we are. Although the conditions of 
our creatureliness “never condition us absolutely” (11), they are, 
nonetheless, the conditions of the possibility of our living and 
acting at all. We forget them or deny them at our peril. What, 
then, does she think these inexorable and empowering condi-
tions are?  “Life itself, natality and mortality, worldliness, plural-
ity, and the earth” (11). Although she herself does not write from 
a religious perspective, there is much that Lutherans can learn 
from her treatment of our terrestrial, creaturely being—and 
from her darker insight that although “the earth is the very 
quintessence of the human condition,” human beings “[seem] 
to be possessed by a rebellion against human existence as it has 
been given” (2). It is possible, as she acknowledges, that science 
and technology are in the process of actively altering the human 
condition itself, but if we do not even know what it is that we 
are altering (and she identifies “thoughtlessness” as “among the 
outstanding characteristics of our time” [5]), we can hardly make 
reliable judgments about the direction or the consequences of 
that process. But leaving aside the question of whether human 
beings can, in fact, alter the very conditions and limits of our 
own conditioning reality, she confines herself “to an analysis of 
those general human capacities which grow out of the human 
condition and are permanent, that is, which cannot be irretriev-
ably lost so long as the human condition is not changed” (6).
Life and earth require little explanation, but the other four 
dimensions of the human condition require more elaboration. 
Natality and mortality capture “the [biological] conditions 
under which life has been given to man” (9). They can be gath-
ered together as the two dimensions of earthliness. These she calls 
“the most general conditions of human existence” (8). We are 
finite, embodied, limited, perspective-bound creatures who grow, 
change, reproduce ourselves, and eventually decay and die. We 
must labor to sustain the biological processes that maintain life. 
In these dimensions, the human condition is not different from 
the conditions of all animal life, although we differ from the ani-
mals quite remarkably in our ways of meeting these necessities.
Worldliness names the uniquely human capacity to create 
layers of reality that are not given with our biological condi-
tion: linguistic systems; laws and systems for their development, 
amendment, and administration; markets, wealth, and money or 
other media of exchange; electrical power grids and communica-
tion networks; industrial complexes; knowledge and methods of 
inquiry that can be recorded and transmitted across geographi-
cal and temporal boundaries; social trust and moral expecta-
tions—to name only a few of the most obvious. We dwell in a 
biological ecosystem, but we also dwell in a constructed “world” 
of artefacts (Manhattan was not carved out of rock by natural 
forces) and in a transhistorical web of unspecifiably complex 
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mental, social, and operational systems. Worldliness comprises 
our own “self-made conditions, which, their human origin and 
their variability notwithstanding, possess the same conditioning 
power as natural things” (9).
Plurality is “the condition of human action because we are 
all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever 
the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live” (8). We 
lose sight of the extraordinary gift of being different—probably 
because so many of our most vexing problems arise out of this 
gift. Arendt urges us to appreciate the fact that the alternative to 
this would be a situation in which all human beings “were end-
lessly reproducible repetitions of the same model, whose nature 
or essence was the same for all and as predictable as the nature 
or essence of any other thing” (8). There would be no disagree-
ment, no conflict, no dissonance, no interhuman tension, no 
hierarchies, no equality (since that is distinct from sameness), no 
surprises, no change, no action properly so called, no history, no 
politics, no ethics, no evaluation, no failure, and no success. There 
would be general laws and predictable behavior, and that is all.
The full appreciation of the conditions of worldliness and 
plurality conveys an additional coloration upon the condition of 
natality. We are born as biological creatures requiring biological 
sustenance, but every infant arrives as a stranger and a poten-
tial actor capable of bringing about something new: “the new 
beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world 
only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning 
something anew, that is, of acting. In this sense of initiative, an 
element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent in all 
human activities” (9).
The church’s educational mission
Reflection on our creatureliness makes it hard to sustain the 
dream of perfect harmony as anything other than an eschato-
logical hope. It helps us to see why the only peace for which we 
can hope is fissured and unstable, a temporal possibility best 
understood, as Macquarrie has reminded us, as an endless, 
difficult, and costly process, not a situation or achievement. 
Understanding peace in this way, we might think together about 
how the “ministry and advocacy” of peace might be folded into 
our college’s educational mission as something other than pious 
exhortations to beat swords into plowshares and make war no 
more. We might begin by simply asking how the colleges can 
help to create a vibrant community of moral deliberation in 
which dividing walls are broken down, coercion is reserved for 
“last resort,” and inspirited care and respect crowd out recrimi-
nation and abuse.
Worldliness
“World” is through and through communal. The great articu-
late systems that constitute the fabric of our human lives are 
received through education. Education is the memory and the 
life and the future of these systems, and every educative object 
and event (every conversation, every examination, every book, 
every syllabus, every classroom exchange) both preserves the 
received system and changes it, forming the newcomers for their 
own work of preservation and reformation. Taking “worldliness” 
seriously not only enriches our understanding of the critical 
importance of what we do as teachers but also suggests that we 
might do well to centralize, perhaps as a feature of our general 
education curriculum, courses that explore the nature, function, 
meaning, indispensability, frictions, and operations of human 
social systems. Lutheran colleges might even facilitate Christian 
community by enabling their students to see the church as just 
such a social system (it may be far more than that, but it is most 
definitely at least that): a living community of word and action, 
not some sort of sea-bottom sedimentary “deposit of faith.” 
Courses that stress the interrelations of individuals and com-
munities (the dependence of individuals on their communities, 
the frictions between the individual and the community, the 
responsibilities of individuals for the preservation and adapta-
tion of their communities) might help our graduates not only to 
function better in the civic world but also to exercise more effec-
tive lay and professional leadership in the church itself.
Earthliness 
We are finite, limited, embodied, perspective-bound creatures 
who see partially and imperfectly. While we all offer lip service 
to this notion, left to our own devices most of us operate as if we 
were the sole possessors of truth and as if some neon light had 
gone on in the sky assuring us that our judgments are endorsed 
by god. If as educators we were to take our earthliness seriously, 
we would spend a lot more time helping our students understand 
that human moral and intellectual claims are judgments, not 
some kind of transcriptions of truth read off reality as we might 
copy out a passage from a book. And if we go out of our way to 
teach our students that human moral and intellectual claims are 
judgments, we must, of course, go even further out of our way 
to help our students make discriminations between judgments 
that are (comparatively) suspect and unreliable and judgments 
that are (comparatively) trustworthy and reliable. In the face of 
entrenched American anti-intellectualism and postmodern uni-
versalized suspicion, we must encourage respect for expertise and 
other forms of earned authority. But we must pair this emphasis 
on deference to legitimate authority and proven wisdom with 
companion emphasis on the responsibility to actively engage 
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that authority and wisdom patiently, critically, and discerningly. 
Conscience is not passively received; it is actively formed, and it 
is because it is so closely linked with personal integrity that we 
speak of it as inviolable (but not infallible). By way of the portal 
of conscience we can, as educators, reopen the discussion of tol-
erance, not as a political expediency, but as itself a fully defined 
virtue, an excellence grounded in a Christian understanding of 
creation and a bulwark against idolatry.
Mortality
We are temporal creatures in a temporal, historical world. The 
lives of persons, organizations, institutions, and civilizations 
have an arc that rises, peaks, and deteriorates. nothing endures 
that does not change, and some things that change do not 
endure. For that reason, we might consider making it our goal 
to see that no student graduates with a bachelor’s degree from a 
Lutheran college without having developed a refined historical 
consciousness. Could we offer more courses in history—perhaps 
history across the curriculum?  Could we require more history 
or at least more courses that work historically?  We should do 
less comparing of snapshots (this was Rome, this was feudal 
Europe, this was the Renaissance) and more looking at histori-
cal change, the evolution of social systems, and their interplay. 
How did this group of people actually get from A to B?  While 
it certainly continues to be important to study religions in light 
of typological differences and to examine religious beliefs and 
practices on their own merits, could we do a better job of study-
ing Christianity as it changes over time?  Where this is done at 
all, it tends to be done as a study in the history of ideas, but we 
need also to study Christian beliefs, teachings, and practices as 
they change in relation to changes in economics, migrations, or 
political arrangements—and in relation to the social situation of 
the members of particular church bodies.
Natality 
Our students are the natal horde of newcomers, the strang-
ers who are only partially at home in the world that we have 
ourselves received, sustained, and remade. They both ardently 
seek assimilation into our world(s) and rebelliously resist it. We 
know them, at some deep level of our teacherly hearts, as both 
our hope and our enemy. If the things we treasure, and the fabric 
of memory and understanding that we represent and preserve, 
are to persist into the unfathomable future, they will have to be 
preserved and transmitted by these alternately sullen and recep-
tive, alternately passionate and indifferent, young people hidden 
under their baseball caps in the back row. These memories, these 
interpretations, these intentions will have to be adapted and 
nurtured by this rising generation as our generation has adapted 
and nurtured them. And these young people, as they take these 
gifts from our hands, will change, and perhaps discard, what 
we have spent our lives on, just as, in so spending our lives, 
we changed and sometimes lost, sometimes rejected what we 
received. The blessing in all this is that they will, in speech and 
action, renew and reconstruct these traditions as they make 
them their own.
Plurality  
There are six billion of us and we are all (despite the degree of 
our genetic similarity) remarkably different. We come from 
different social worlds; even within the same social world, 
people have different experiences depending on their race, their 
sexuality, their class and status, and innumerable other factors. 
We live in multiple social worlds and “speak” multiple symbolic 
languages. Lutherans are different from the unchurched and 
from other Christians; Lutherans are, let us not forget, different 
from Lutherans.
I would like to see Lutheran colleges make a concerted 
attempt to supplement our course offerings in the traditional 
study of epistemology with attentiveness to American prag-
matism and with careful and informed study of the sociology 
of knowledge. I have noticed over the years that scholars with 
religious commitments (and certainly religious leaders writing 
for broad publics) tend to demonize pragmatism and the sociol-
ogy of knowledge as subjectivistic and relativistic endeavors that 
undermine or deny the validity of moral judgments and human 
efforts to sort out truth from error. This represents a very unfor-
tunate misunderstanding of both American pragmatism and 
the serious attempts now underway to study human knowledge 
claims contextually. We are not obliged to choose sides between 
the spineless relativists and what William James called “absolut-
ism.” Scholars and scientists have been busy for a century and a 
half developing alternatives to this false dichotomy. However, if 
so many opinion-shapers have somehow overlooked this devel-
opment, it seems likely that we are not doing a very good job of 
teaching it. 
In addition, taking plurality seriously implies that we 
welcome conflict for what it is: testimony to our individual 
uniqueness and the wellspring of our freedom. Conflict and 
controversy are often signs of the health of a community, not 
an index of its decay (though if space permitted, it would be 
important to differentiate constructive conflict that builds up, 
adapts, and revitalizes a community from the kind of conflict 
that is implicated in the collapse of social systems). In any social 
system (or sub-system), the fundamental resources of the com-
munity include interpretations of reality that form the con-
ceptual framework and horizon of both thought and practice. 
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The inexhaustible richness of earth and world alike continually 
outruns or overflows any and every attempted human account. 
It is unquestionably the responsibility of educators to bring 
order to the “booming, buzzing confusion” of human experi-
ence. It is our responsibility to find the narrative threads that 
make the past meaningful. It is our work to identify patterns 
and to sort out the coherent from the incoherent. But we must 
be careful, even as we go about that work, to acknowledge the 
provisional evolving nature of our interpretations and to honor 
the human condition of plurality by equipping our students to 
deal resourcefully and fearlessly with change and variability. 
When human beings build systems (whether conceptual or 
social), there will always be anomalies—features of reality that 
cannot readily be fitted into the pattern. These anomalies are, 
usually in small ways but sometimes in major ways, threats to 
the integrity and sustainability of the system; fears, along with 
our deep desire for orderliness and control, more often than 
not lead us to “forget” or paper over or even falsify these signals 
of fragility and limitation. We want, instead, to inspire in our 
students the courage to acknowledge the anomalies and to read 
them accurately for what they can tell us about the limitations 
and vulnerabilities of our nonetheless indispensable convictions 
and social arrangements.
Coda
Conflict, disagreement, divergence in interpretation and judg-
ment concerning the true, the good, the beautiful, and the 
right—these are indelible features of the human condition and 
the fissures in the face of peace. We cannot make them disap-
pear. We should not even want to make them disappear, because 
they are part and parcel of our humanity, our creatureliness. 
We can, however, try to prevent them from becoming sources of 
destruction. We can try to prevent these fissures from turning 
into rifts and hostilities that break us apart and isolate us, one 
from another. We can try to prevent them from turning into the 
fractures and hatreds that destroy our peace.
The task force, in one small document, has offered our church 
our hope that this may be so. In a much larger way, over a much 
longer time, in more varied contexts, and possibly with much 
greater success, Lutheran colleges may also foster this hope. This, 
it seems to me, though I certainly see only “through a darkened 
glass,” is how the work and learnings of the task force might 
contribute to reflection on “the Lutheran calling in education.”
Endnotes
1. This article is derived from a paper titled “The ELCA Study on 
Sexuality: Lessons for the Church’s Educational Mission,” which was 
originally delivered July 31, 2005, at the conference The Vocation of 
a Lutheran College: The Lutheran Calling in Education, at Capital 
University in Columbus, OH. The conference was sponsored by the 
ELCA Division for Higher Education and Schools.
2. For an important argument that the apparent conflict of these 
distinctive ways of reasoning might be overcome by imaging the moral 
life interactionally in terms of man-the-answerer, see chap. 1 of   
H. Richard niebuhr’s The Responsible Self.
3. I am regretfully aware of the inadequacies of this brief paragraph. 
For a full and very illuminating sociological discussion of social organi-
zation, see John Bowker’s rich and incisive essay “Religions as Systems.” 
For a political treatment of the notion of “overlapping consensus” 
(common ground achieved in relation to, or in spite of, continuing 
disagreements), see John Rawls’s Political Liberalism.
4. Fifty-eight percent of the voting members rejected a substitute 
motion reserving “the solemnizing and blessing of sexual unions. . . 
for the marriage of a man and a woman.” Thirty-eight percent voted in 
favor of a substitute motion that would have removed all policy barriers 
“to rostered service for otherwise qualified persons in same-gender, 
covenanted relationships that are ‘mutual, chaste, and faithful.’” The 
third resolution from the Church Council was affirmed by fully forty-
nine percent of those voting, even though it was opposed by Lutherans 
Concerned (because it routed the path to ministry through a process 
of applying to be considered an “exception”) and therefore probably 
lost the votes of some, perhaps many, who support the rostering of gays 
and lesbians in committed relationships. These votes would have been 
unimaginable even twenty years ago.
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AS A SOCIOLOgy  PROFESSOR who teaches a course in 
sexuality at an ELCA institution, I was honored by the invita-
tion to present to the ELCA Task Force for Studies on Sexuality. 
I enjoyed the interactions as both an educator and a student. I 
am neither a Lutheran nor a theologian, and I found it fascinat-
ing to learn about the process and outcomes of Journey Together 
Faithfully, Part Two, and about the ongoing process behind the 
production of Journey Together Faithfully, Part Three. I under-
stood that, while homosexuality had been the primary focus of 
the previous document, this new document aimed to address the 
ELCA’s position on other dimensions of sexuality. 
My primary role at this meeting was that of a sexuality stud-
ies educator. As a researcher, scholar, and professor, I am also 
informed by past professional experiences as a sexual health 
educator. I view sexuality as an innate part of being human. 
In addition to serving the obvious function of reproduction, 
sexuality can be a source not only of pleasure and intimacy but 
also of guilt, shame, and fear. From a health education perspec-
tive, I see sexuality as a basic component of human health and 
well-being. From a sociological perspective, I examine how 
our culture shapes sexual norms (behavioral expectations) and 
values. I also focus on how our sexual practices transform the 
societies in which we live.
As we progress through our lives, each of us makes sexual 
decisions based on knowledge, experiences, and values. Physical 
changes, developmental concerns, and social factors shape our 
experiences of sexuality as we age. In this article, I draw on 
empirical research from the social, behavioral, and life sciences 
to highlight key findings about the learned components of 
sexuality from puberty through late adulthood. In particular, 
I will focus on three aspects of sexuality that the ELCA Task 
Force found to be particularly relevant and controversial for 
their parishioners: premarital sexuality, sexuality after divorce, 
and nonmarital sexuality in late adulthood. I will present some 
of the key research findings that pertain to these topics and 
conclude each section with questions that reflect concerns raised 
in the Task Force discussions.  
Premarital Sexuality:  
Adolescence through Early Adulthood
From birth, we are sexual beings: we learn from our bodies what 
feels good or bad, and we learn from our parents, pastors, and 
others what is right and wrong. By the time we reach puberty, 
about 40% of girls and 38% of boys have masturbated (Bancroft). 
In addition to the sensual components of sexuality, we have also 
learned the gender components: the feminine and masculine 
norms of sexuality that tell us what is right or wrong for girls and 
for boys. 
Sexuality in Adolescence
Biologists define puberty as the developmental stage in which the 
human body becomes capable of reproduction. Social and behav-
ioral scientists define adolescence as the psychological and social 
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state that takes place from the start of puberty and lasts until 
full adult status is attained. Sexually, this is a time of growth  
and confusion, with the body often maturing faster than 
the corresponding emotional and intellectual capabilities. 
Hormonal changes bring about a dramatic increase in sexual 
interest, with increasing incidences of masturbation.
The “sexual revolution” of the 1960s marked a major shift in 
adolescent sexual norms, and the age of first intercourse began 
to decrease. By 2002, researchers found that the average age for 
men’s first intercourse was 16.9 years old, and the average age 
for women’s was 17.4 years old. One disturbing aspect of this 
trend was the report of coercive sex: about 22% of teenage girls 
described their first intercourse as unwanted. Another finding 
was the demise of a long-standing trend of female teen peer pres-
sure to abstain from premarital intercourse.  Today’s teen girls 
are more likely than in a previous generation to encourage each 
other to become sexually active during their high-school years 
(Alan guttmacher Institute 2002). 
Today’s United States teens come of age in an era of conflict-
ing messages about sexuality: the overwhelming majority will 
receive abstinence-only sex education, while living in a social 
context where mainstream media normalizes increasingly graphic 
and permissive portrayals of teen sexual intercourse. While  
our federal government continues to increase funding for absti-
nence-only sex education, numerous well-respected studies have 
concluded that abstinence-only education does not significantly 
lower the age of first intercourse, reduce STDs, or reduce unin-
tended pregnancies among teens (Contraception Report).  
In contrast, comprehensive or “abstinence-plus” sexuality educa-
tion has been found to be highly effective (kirby, Office of the 
Surgeon general), yet few United States school districts offer 
these curricula. 
Sexuality in Early Adulthood
young adults grapple with many developmental concerns 
related to sexuality: such as how to integrate love and sex, how 
to commit to intimate relationships, how to make childbearing 
decisions, and how to protect their sexual health. The post-high 
school years are a prime time to develop a sexual philosophy 
because many young adults move out of their family home to 
pursue educational and career goals. With this newfound free-
dom and independence, many young adults find themselves re-
evaluating the religious standards of sexual morality with which 
they were raised. Studies have found that most college students 
expect to engage in sexual intercourse during their undergradu-
ate years and that this sex will take place within loving relation-
ships (Sprecher and Mckinney; Sprecher 2002).
Researchers have noted several social shifts that have trans-
formed the sexual landscape for single, young adults. In general, 
the past few decades have seen a sharp increase in the average age 
of first marriage. One reason is that more young adults are the 
children of divorce and do not want to rush into marriage. In 
addition, longer periods of education and training are required 
for many career options. For reasons of either self-fulfillment or 
economic necessity, more women want to establish their careers 
before marriage: it is increasingly impractical for one spouse to 
be the breadwinner. 
Historically, young adults in the United States found it more 
reasonable to abstain from sexual intercourse until marriage 
when first marriages occurred at younger ages: the typical period 
of abstinence may have been only three to five years (from the 
end of puberty to the beginning of marital sex). This trend of 
later marriages has supported the normalization of premarital 
sex and cohabitation. Cohabitation has become a common part 
of young adult life, as many opt to defer marriage. Half will have 
cohabited by age thirty (Strong). “Living in sin,” has become 
“living together.” The moral and social sanction is nonexistent 
in the minds of many Americans. However, monogamy is still 
valued. A 2004 ABC news poll found that 80% of young singles 
are exclusively dating one person.
The most significant difference between cohabiting same-sex 
couples and heterosexual couples is that the heterosexuals can 
legally marry. Another key difference concerns social support for 
a same-sex couple’s commitment to each other. While most par-
ents of heterosexual young adults give their children a “pro-mar-
riage” message, research finds that parents are much less likely 
to urge their gay or lesbian child to commit to a stable same-sex 
relationship (Peplau). This study found that most young adults, 
no matter their sexual orientation, desire an intimate, loving 
relationship with another person.
Today’s young singles have greater sexual experience during 
their adolescence, feel less shame and stigma about premarital 
sex, and have more options to prevent unintended pregnancies. 
However, partly due to insufficient sex education, the United 
States has witnessed a rise in unintended pregnancies and sexu-
ally transmitted diseases among the young adult population. In 
the broader sense of sex education, sexual health educators and 
researchers have also noticed a disturbing trend in how young 
adults today approach the trajectory of sexual intimacy. Popular 
metaphors, such as those about baseball and advancing through 
the bases on the way to a “homerun” of intercourse, no longer 
apply to today’s teens and young adults. In a world of abstinence-
only education, sexual “abstinence” has become a strangely 
defined term. Studies reveal that oral sex has become normal-
ized as the behavior one advances to after kissing, and that anal 
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intercourse is a preferable precursor to vaginal intercourse (Alan 
guttmacher Institute 2000). While both of these behaviors 
carry considerable risk for disease transmission, many believe 
that their virginity is still “intact” as long as penile-vaginal inter-
course has not occurred. Sexual health educators are concerned 
that teens and young adults are not being educated about the 
full range of sexual behaviors that are less risky than penetrative 
forms of intercourse: for example, mutual masturbation, sensual 
massage, and manual stimulation. 
Questions to Consider:
• What role should the church play in providing sexuality 
education, and what type(s) of education should it provide? 
• What role should the church play in advising which types of 
sexual activities are morally and spiritually right for young 
adults in dating relationships?
• With the normalization of premarital sex and cohabitation, 
what moral and spiritual guidance can the church offer to 
adults who may not marry until they are in their thirties or 
who may never marry?
• Should the church recognize and bless those young adults who 
are cohabiting and in committed monogamous relationships?
Nonmarital Sexuality:  
Sexuality Issues of Divorce and Single Parenthood
Our social, religious, and legal institutions continue to view 
marriage as the relationship in which sexuality is legitimate. 
However, many United States adults struggle as their sexual-
ity is shaped by realities of divorce and/or single parenting. 
Demographics reveal a rise in the number of single-parent 
families and a growth in post-divorce singles. These adults are 
increasingly deciding to reenter the dating scene, only to dis-
cover that there are distinct sexual challenges. 
In middle adulthood, individuals often find themselves 
grappling with developmental concerns such as the biological 
aging process. The consequences of divorce present additional 
challenges: stigmatization, decrease in income, and emotional 
distress. When children are involved, additional stressors factor 
into decisions to date again. 
Engaging in sexual behavior with someone following a sepa-
ration or divorce is significant. Sexual intimacy with a new part-
ner symbolizes that previous vows are no longer valid. Often, 
the renewal of a sex life helps adults to accept their single status. 
However, many religious teachings do not approve of sex outside 
of marriage, and many divorcees feel anxious about their sexual-
ity. Personally, they may be fearful of becoming physically and 
emotionally vulnerable with a new partner. Those who have had 
a long marriage may feel out of touch with the current norms of 
dating and sex. On the plus side, post-divorce sexual experiences 
have been linked to increased well-being (Spanier). 
Single Parenting
As the results of both divorce and unmarried births, about 30% of 
families are headed by single parents (Fields). Familial responsi-
bilities often mean that single parents are not part of the “singles 
world.” They lack the leisure time and money to invest in dating. 
Research shows that divorced adults’ sexual decisions are directly 
affected by the presence of children. For example, divorced women 
who are childless are more likely to be sexually active than those 
who are parents (Stack). Single parents are often concerned about 
the morality that they are modeling for their children. 
Conscious of being role models, single parents find it more 
complicated when negotiating the world of dating. Social 
stereotypes about single men and women often include the trait 
of promiscuity.  Many single parents do not want their children 
to view them as sexual beings. This results in difficult decisions 
about how much of their lives they can share with their dates. In 
particular, they face tough decisions about whether their dates 
will be allowed to meet their children and whether overnight 
dates are appropriate.
Questions to Consider:
• What role should the church play in advising which types of 
sexual activities are morally and spiritually right for divorced 
adults in dating relationships?
• Divorced adults may have financial and familial reasons 
for not wanting to remarry. Should the church recognize 
and bless committed, monogamous relationships between 
divorced adults?
• How should single parents determine what is right or wrong 
in terms of their sexual choices and the impact those choices 
have on their children?
 
Sexuality in Late Adulthood:  
Marital and Nonmarital Concerns
As individuals enter late adulthood, they find themselves need-
ing to adjust to the process of aging. People may not be sexually 
active throughout their entire lives, but they remain sexual 
beings. Sexual feelings and behaviors can be healthy throughout 
the lifespan. good sexual relationships can provide intimacy 
and human connections that help ease the pain of aging, loss of 
health, and loss of loved ones.  
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Sexual Stereotypes of Aging
In our society, we associate sexuality with youth and the ability 
to procreate. The sexuality of older adults tends to be invisible. 
Society either discounts or denies their sexuality. These beliefs 
contribute to a view of old age as a depressing time of life when 
one is unlikely to be a part of a fulfilling, intimate relationship. 
negative stereotypes can also produce negative body image in 
older adults who may have absorbed social messages that their 
aging bodies are no longer “sexy.”
In reality, research shows that many older adults experience 
high levels of satisfaction and well-being. The varied aspects 
of sexuality – emotional, sensual, and relational – are enjoyed 
regardless of age. For example, a 1998 survey conducted by the 
national Council on the Aging found that 66% of adults age 
sixty or older reported that their sex life was equal to or better 
than it had been when they were in their forties. 
Health and Partner Availability
The most significant determinants of an older individual’s sexual 
activity are illnesses and partner availability. Health can affect 
sexual behaviors in many different ways. One common example 
is that medications may produce “sexual side effects” that render 
the person less capable or incapable of experiencing sexual plea-
sure. In addition, increasing frailty and chronic illnesses, such 
as osteoporosis and heart disease, may limit mobility, strength, 
stamina, and/or make a person fearful of sexual exertion. Some 
of the normal physiological changes of aging also impact sexual-
ity by manifesting as slower sexual response, impotency, and vag-
inal changes (for example, loss of elasticity and lubrication). On 
the flip side, physicians report that a healthy sex life can promote 
overall health and well-being for older adults (Cross).
Availability of partners plays a major role in how older adults 
experience sexuality. It is well documented that the majority 
of women outlive the majority of men in the United States. In 
contrast to older women, older men have significantly more 
opportunities to pursue opposite-sex relationships (Carr). 
Approximately four out of five women who are seventy-five or 
older do not have a male sexual partner. In contrast, over 60% 
of the men in this age group do have a partner (AARP). The 
consequences of this gender gap have both personal and public 
health ramifications. With the advent of prescription drugs (for 
example, Viagra) that aid male erections, older men are more 
sexually active than in past generations. Drug-enhanced stamina 
paired with the gender gap makes it likely for partner-sharing to 
occur, such that each older man may have two or three female 
sexual partners who are within his peer group. Public health 
problems are magnified when older men seek out the services 
of prostitutes and bring sexually transmitted diseases, includ-
ing HIV, back to their senior girlfriends. In December 2004, 
a Cnn televised special to commemorate World AIDS Day 
included a segment on the recent outbreaks of HIV/AIDS in 
Florida retirement communities (“Staying Alive”). Drugs like 
Viagra, coupled with generational norms against condom use, 
the absence of fertility issues, and traditional gender norms (for 
example, men being sexually assertive and females being sexually 
passive) have produced a current cohort of United States senior 
citizens who are at high risk for sexually transmitted infections.
Questions to Consider:
• Why are many so offended by the idea of older people want-
ing to be sexual?  
• How might disparaging attitudes about aging and sexuality 
negatively impact the “golden years” of a marriage?  
• What role can or should the church play in dispelling myths, 
building confidence, and giving older adults permission to  
be sexual?
• given that many single older adults have pensions and other 
financial circumstances that make remarriage not a viable 
option, should the church recognize and bless their commit-
ted, monogamous relationships? 
Conclusions
Over time throughout cultures, sexuality has been shaped by 
gender roles (social expectations for men and women), marital 
norms, and beliefs about homosexuality. Different religious texts 
give some guidance as to what is morally and spiritually right. 
The majority of Judeo-Christian writings on sexuality empha-
size the sacredness of sex within the bonds of marriage and the 
sinfulness of infidelity. However, marriage is an ever-evolving 
institution, and it is vital that communities of faith consider the 
contemporary institution of marriage in the United States and 
its corresponding impact on sexuality norms and values. In dis-
cussing key sexuality issues throughout three major stages in the 
life-span, I have tried to illuminate some current social phenom-
ena and hypothesize the challenges for communities of faith. 
One of the difficulties in talking about sexuality – in any 
context – is that there is little agreement as to what constitutes 
“healthy sexuality.”  In 2002, the World Health Organization 
defined sexual health as “the state of physical, emotional, mental, 
and social well-being related to sexuality.”  This definition takes 
us beyond the mere absence of disease or dysfunction. This 
conceptualization requires a positive and respectful approach to 
sexuality and sexual relationships. The focus is not only about 
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the freedom from coercion, but also about the freedom to expe-
rience safe and pleasurable sexual experiences. If we are willing 
to consider a broader definition of healthy sexuality within the 
social context of contemporary trends, then communities of 
faith face difficult decisions. Does the pursuit of healthy sexual-
ity put one at odds with long-standing religious doctrines?  Can 
the church convince parishioners that modern sexual norms 
and values are wrong?  Or, is it worth considering how religious 
morality can be preserved in a society with ever-evolving beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviors about sexuality?  I commend the ELCA 
for having taken a leadership role in promoting open, honest, 
and often difficult discussions about sexuality and look forward 
to reading Journey Together Faithfully, Part Three.
Endnotes
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THE gOAL OF THIS PAPER is to articulate a method of ethical 
deliberation about a particular social issue. Over the last seven and 
one-half years, I have been asked many times to speak about the 
issue of the Bible and homosexuality, to lead workshops on the issue, 
and to facilitate the ELCA study Journeying Together Faithfully. 
These experiences have led to the realization that there is a great deal 
of confusion and misunderstanding about the nature of the Bible 
and the way it functions as scripture. In response I have been work-
ing at articulating a Lutheran “critical traditionalist” hermeneutic. 
My intention in this paper is to test this hermeneutic by using it to 
critique Robert gagnon’s reading of Rom. 1:18-32 and to provide 
an alternative reading of the same text, reflecting briefly on the 
theological-ethical implications of this method. Before turning to 
that task, however, it is necessary to explain how and why this has 
become an issue of importance for me by reflecting briefly on my 
own social location and agenda. 
I am a professor and scholar of the new Testament and 
Christian origins at Augustana College, an ELCA liberal arts 
college where I hold tenure and serve as the Chair of the Religion 
Department. In the eyes of many this makes me an “expert.” In 
terms of education, income, and other socio-economic indicators 
my profession places me in the upper middle class, a position I was 
not born into, but which enables me to enjoy material comforts that 
sometimes prick at my conscience. My relatively privileged status 
is further enhanced by the fact that I am a white, heterosexual, 
Christian wife and mother living in a country where those factors 
are valued (Holtmann 27-28).1 On the other hand, I am a vertically 
challenged person in a world where just about every material object 
that we use in our day-to-day lives appears to have been designed by 
and for tall, taller, and excessively tall persons. Of necessity, there-
fore, I see and experience the world from a “different” perspective. 
As a female I am intensely aware of how under-represented women 
are in the academy and in the church, especially in leadership posi-
tions. Even when we are admitted to the inner circles, all too often 
we remain the “other” at the table. For me personally, this translates 
into a sense of liminality, of being poised at a threshold with one 
foot on either side. The sense of being simultaneously both an 
insider and an outsider is intensified by the fact that I am an immi-
grant twice over, having been born in Finland, raised in Canada, 
and now living and working as a resident alien in the United States. 
It is natural for me, therefore, to feel a certain affinity and empathy 
for persons who struggle at the peripheries of society. The combi-
nation of those feelings with a Lutheran theology of the cross has 
convinced me that I am called to stand intentionally in solidarity 
with the oppressed. Thus, I have come gradually to see my role as an 
educator as consciousness-raising about and advocacy for those who 
are marginalized. It is in context of doing just that that questions 
about the ethics of biblical interpretation have become significant.
A Lutheran Critical Traditionalist Hermeneutic
 “Critical traditionalist” is a phrase borrowed from my Hebrew 
Bible professor, Dr. Robert Polzin. He originally coined the 
term “critical traditionalism” to label what he saw as the domi-
nant voice within the Deuteronomistic history. He writes, “The 
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ultimate semantic authority of the Book of Deuteronomy […] 
proclaims an attitude toward the word of god that claims 
the right to emphasize now one aspect, viz., judgment, now 
another aspect, viz., mercy, of god’s relationship with Israel, 
depending on the situation in which they find themselves” 
(Polzin 68). Polzin asserts that the overriding hermeneutical 
perspective of the Deuteronomist is that “subsequent revi-
sionary  interpretation” is not only necessary, but modeled by 
Moses himself in such a way that opposing views are neverthe-
less allowed to have their say (Polzin 205-206). Critical tradi-
tionalism, therefore, is a biblically grounded hermeneutical 
perspective that recognizes the need for constant revision and 
varying interpretations of core traditions as contexts change 
through space and over time. 
It is my contention that Lutheran biblical hermeneutics have 
from their inception reflected such a critical traditionalism. For 
Luther, the Word of god refers in the primary sense to “the 
eternal Logos, the son of god” who became personally incarnate 
in the historical person of Jesus of nazareth, and secondly to 
the proclaimed Word of god through which creation occurred 
and salvation was announced. The Bible as the written Word 
of god is “the definitive documentary on both the incarnation 
and oral revelation of god’s Word” (Lazareth 33-34). Scripture is 
thus the word of god in a secondary or derivate sense (Lotz 263). 
Its authority derives, not so much from what it says literally, 
but from its ability to re-present and re-embody the life-giving 
Word. While it is, in Luther’s words, the “queen” that “must 
rule, and everyone must obey,” Scripture remains the servant of 
“the Lord who is the king of Scripture” (Lotz 264).2 In other 
words, “Scripture cannot rightly be interpreted in opposition to 
Christ’s person and work” (Lotz 263).
given this understanding of scripture, a Lutheran critical 
traditionalist hermeneutic must have at least three major compo-
nents to it. First, it must honor scripture as Queen of the church 
by taking seriously what biblical texts say, and, even more 
importantly, what they mean. One way to get at that mean-
ing is to answer the question, “who says what to whom about 
what under what circumstances for what purposes.” The answer 
necessitates paying attention, not only to the genre and rhetoric 
of a passage, but also to the historical, social, and cultural cir-
cumstances addressed by, reflected in, and which gave rise to it. 
Second, a Lutheran critical traditionalist hermeneutic must be 
ever mindful of Christ, who is the king of scripture, and whose 
mission is the purpose of the church. The good news about 
justification by grace through faith in Jesus Christ functions as 
the primary criteria for deciding whether a biblical passage is 
relevant to our contemporary circumstances and how it might 
be used in teaching and preaching. 
Finally, a Lutheran critical traditionalist hermeneutic holds 
us ethically accountable by demanding that we reflect on both 
the faithfulness and the consequences of our reading. Does our 
interpretation respect the text as articulated in its originating 
historical context? Does our reading and application of scripture 
promote the mission of Christ? What are the consequences 
of our interpretation with respect to race, ethnicity, econom-
ics, gender, sexuality, self-determination, and so forth? Will 
it be life-giving or death-dealing?  For whom? Why?  Indeed 
these may be the most important questions that we need to ask 
ourselves as we read, interpret, and attempt to apply scripture in 
our daily lives. 
The Use of Romans 1:18-32  
by Robert Gagnon
In The Bible and Homosexual Practice: Texts and Hermeneutics, 
Robert gagnon sets out to demonstrate that the Bible unequivo-
cally defines same-sex intercourse as sin, and that there are no 
valid hermeneutical arguments for overriding biblical authority 
in this matter. His position is that “same-sex intercourse consti-
tutes an inexcusable rebellion against the intentional design of 
the created order.” It is not only degrading to the participants 
but is physically, morally, and socially destructive (gagnon 37). 
gagnon’s book is, thus, not about proclaiming the gospel but 
about laying down the law that will protect the purity and secu-
rity of the communities with which he identifies. 
For gagnon, the credibility of the Bible’s stance on this 
subject is rooted in the revelatory authority of scripture, the 
witness of nature to which the Bible points, and arguments 
from experience, reason, and science (gagnon 41). It is not my 
intention to review the entire book but to focus on gagnon’s 
treatment of Rom. 1:24-27, which for him is the central text on 
which Christians must base their moral doctrine on homo-
sexual conduct (gagnon 229). As he describes it, this passage 
is the most substantial and explicit discussion of the subject 
in the Bible: it is in the new Testament, it explicitly refers to 
lesbianism, and it occurs within a significant body of material 
originating from a single writer. Romans 1:24-27 is also in his 
estimate “the most difficult text for proponents of homosexual 
behavior to overturn” (gagnon 230). For gagnon then, this 
is the authoritative text because of (a) its location in the Bible 
specifically in the new Testament (do we detect a supersession-
ist theology here?), (b) its content, that is, what it says, (c) its 
apostolic authorship, and (d) its perceived unassailability by 
proponents of homosexuality.
gagnon begins by placing the specific passage (Rom. 1:24-27) 
within its larger literary context (Rom. 1:18-32), which he asserts 
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is Paul’s depiction of “what life used to be like before believ-
ing in Christ and receiving the Spirit but which has now been 
fundamentally transformed for those who are in Christ. It por-
trays the predicament of all unsaved humanity” (gagnon 245). 
Within that larger context, Paul employs a typical Hellenistic-
Jewish critique of gentile sin in Rom. 1:18-32 in order to set up 
an imaginary Jewish dialogue partner who rejects Paul’s law-free 
gospel for gentiles and regards Torah observance as excus-
ing himself from god’s judgment. gagnon argues that Paul’s 
purpose is to show that god’s verdict is just and right because 
the gentiles knowingly act contrary to the knowledge of god’s 
intentions that is available to them in creation by engaging in 
idolatry and same-sex intercourse (gagnon 246-47). gagnon 
seeks, thus, to answer the basic exegetical question of who says 
what to whom about what in what circumstances for what pur-
poses. He correctly identifies the genre of the passage as a typical 
Hellenistic-Jewish critique of gentiles, but fails to explore the 
implications of Paul’s use of such a stereotype and misconstrues 
Paul’s audience and purpose. 
gagnon’s treatment of Rom. 1:26-27 is based on drawing 
out the parallels between idolatry and same-sex eroticism. He 
asserts that just as “idolatry is a deliberate suppression of the 
truth available to pagans in the world around them…so too is 
same-sex intercourse” (gagnon 254). What connects these two 
for gagnon is Paul’s use of the phrase “contrary to nature.” His 
argument is that just as visual perception of the material world 
should lead to a mental perception of the god who created it, 
so visual perception of male-female bodily complementarity 
should lead to an understanding of the rightness of “natural,” 
that is, heterosexual, intercourse (gagnon 254-57). gagnon 
contends that Paul selects homosexual conduct as “exhibit A” of 
culpable gentile depravity because it “represents one of the clear-
est instances of conscious suppression of revelation in nature by 
gentiles, inasmuch as it involves denying clear anatomical gender 
differences and functions” (gagnon 264). While gagnon clearly 
sets out the inner logic of these verses with respect to the alleged 
relationship of idolatry and same-sex intercourse, he fails to rec-
ognize that this logic may derive from the original Hellenistic-
Jewish critique that Paul recites rather than from the purposes 
and intentions of Paul. Additionally his entire treatment of 
natural/unnatural language presupposes modern categories 
rather than ancient greco-Roman ones.3
Returning to the larger literary context (Rom. 1:18-32), 
gagnon describes Paul’s rhetorical strategy as beginning with “a 
very clear example of unethical conduct and then…widening the 
net until it captures all of humanity” (gagnon 277). According 
to gagnon, Paul moves from the discussion of same-sex inter-
course to a vice list (1:29-31) that is aimed mainly at gentiles 
but which blurs the boundary between gentile and Jew, and 
finally to the statement in 2:1-2 which targets the moral person, 
that is, the Torah-observant Jew. The result is a “sweeping ‘sting 
operation’” in which the Jew who agrees with the condemna-
tion of gentiles in 1:18-32 is compelled by the end of chapter 3 
to acknowledge that Jews deserve judgment as well (gagnon 
278). According to gagnon, the trap that Paul sets in 1:18-32 
is for those Jews who think that they can be justified in god’s 
sight through observance of the Mosaic law and apart from faith 
in Christ (gagnon 280). Since the letter is clearly addressed to 
members of the church in Rome, I am not sure why gagnon 
thinks that Jews would have been Paul’s target audience. 
Overall, his reading of Rom. 1:18-32 is governed by his openly 
avowed agenda of proving that the Bible says that all same-sex 
intercourse is sin and by a supersessionist theology that contains 
a latent anti-Judaism.
An Alternative Reading of Romans 1:18-32
I begin by asking who says what to whom about what in what 
circumstances for what purposes. The letter to the Romans is a 
communication from the apostle Paul to the church in Rome, a 
church which consists of both Judean/Jewish and non-Judean/
gentile (specifically greek) members (Esler 116-119). It is a 
text that is addressed to Christ-followers (not Jews) of differ-
ent ethnic backgrounds. It is the beliefs and behaviors of these 
groups within the church that Paul seeks to alter, in particular 
the ethnocentrism that each group harbors with respect to the 
other.4 The effect of Paul’s argumentation from chapters 1 to 11 is 
to put these two groups on the same footing. neither greek nor 
Judean Christ-followers can portray themselves as inherently 
superior to the other because both groups are equally in bondage 
to sin, but in different ways (Esler 144-145).5 The only way out 
of their common plight is to embrace a new in-group identity, 
specifically the one arising from baptism into Christ (Esler 152). 
It is within this context that Paul recites the information in 
1:18-32, a passage that gagnon describes as a typical Hellenistic-
Jewish critique of gentiles, but which more accurately ought to be 
identified as an “ethnic caricature” (Stowers 94) or an “extreme type 
of stereotyping” developed by certain Judeans/Jews (Esler 147). In 
this stereotype gentiles, or perhaps more accurately the “heathen,” 
(Esler 151) are portrayed as idolaters whom god has punished by 
“causing or allowing their decline into unnatural sexual practices 
(1:24-27) and antisocial vices (1:28-31)” (Stowers 92). The recognition 
of the genre of this particular passage should immediately cause the 
reader to pause. Are ethnic caricatures and stereotypes inspired by 
god? Does the recitation of an ethnic stereotype by a hero of faith 
in a biblical text make it a word of god? Can we in the twenty-first 
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century legitimately hold up such an ethnic caricature as the basis 
for developing a moral doctrine? 
In light of Paul’s comments in 2:1-16, I would have to answer 
unequivocally “no.” Here Paul engages in the rhetorical tech-
nique of speech-in-character creating an imaginary interlocutor 
through whom Paul can criticize his audience without directly 
accusing anyone of anything (Stowers 103, Witherington 76). 
Paul’s first-century audience of greek and Judean Christ-fol-
lowers would “get it.” Paul’s point seems to be that “whoever 
you are” (2:1), you are not in a position to judge, condemn, 
caricature, or stereotype others as if you enjoy some sort of 
special status. This message applies just as much to the newly 
saved greeks who might imagine themselves as superior to their 
pagan neighbors as it might to the Judean Christ-followers who 
grew up socialized to view all non-Judeans as inferior.6 Paul 
insists that god alone can and will judge, repaying “according 
to each one’s deeds” (2:6). Both ethnic groups will be judged by 
the same criteria: those who do evil, both Judean and greek, 
will experience anguish and distress; while those who do good, 
both Judean and greek, will receive glory, honor, and peace 
(2:9-10). The same criteria applies for the heathen: on the one 
hand, they may instinctively do what the law requires; on the 
other, their conflicting thoughts may accuse or excuse them 
on the day of judgment (2:14-16). What Paul condemns in this 
passage is precisely the kind of self-righteous presumptuous 
stereotyping of which 1:18-32 is an example. The word of god 
in this passage is, thus, to be found in Paul’s pronouncement 
of the “law,” which in this case might be summarized as “go 
and do otherwise” (Witherington 77). His proclamation of the 
gospel will come later (3:21ff).
What Paul is doing in this passage, and indeed throughout 
much of Romans, is engaging in what might be called a criti-
cal traditionalist revision of his audience’s beliefs and behavior. 
The challenge that Paul faced was how to build or maintain a 
common in-group identity (as Christ-followers) in a situation 
where church members were not likely to give up their existing 
subgroup (ethnic) identities. Was the church to be divided by 
ethnic distinctions or united in spite of ethnic diversity? Paul’s 
response was to focus on the different ways both groups were 
equally enslaved to sin. Their common plight as sinners coram 
Deo negates any claims of ethnic superiority. The promise that 
god will justify the Judean “on the ground of faith” and the 
non-Judean “through that same faith” (Rom. 3:30) unites both 
groups in a new future where their ethnic identities are recog-
nized but take second place to their shared identity in Christ 
where their only obligation is to “love one another” (Rom. 13:8). 
A Lutheran Reading Romans Today
How might we use this reading in our conversations about 
sexuality? We need to begin by recognizing that Rom. 1:18-32 
is an ethnic stereotype. Since Paul uses this caricature as an 
example of what not to do, that is, engaging in self-righteous 
stereotyping, how can we use its contents as the basis for a 
moral doctrine? How can any conclusion we might draw from it 
about same-sex intercourse be anything but another caricature? 
If Paul’s goal was to subsume (not obliterate) ethnic identities 
under a new overarching identity “in Christ,” could we perhaps 
find here an analogy to our situation today where the issue is 
not ethnic identity but gender/sexual identity?  
In this paper I believe that I have tried to articulate a 
method (or at least a set of questions) that might guide an 
ethically conscious reading of scripture within the Lutheran 
tradition. I am calling this a “Lutheran critical traditionalist 
hermeneutic.” It is distinctively Lutheran because it locates the 
authority of scripture not in the literal content of the Bible, 
that is, in what it says, but in what it means and in particular 
how that meaning re-presents and re-embodies the life-giving 
Word. Another way to say this is that scripture is the word 
of god that bears in, with, and under its human and earthly 
elements the Word of god. This may be the most significant 
difference between my reading of Rom. 1:18-32 and that of 
Robert gagnon. He seems to operate out of an assumption 
that the authority of scripture is in what it says. This leads him 
to commit the common error identified by Stanley Stowers 
as “The acceptance of Rom. 1:18-2:29 as an objective, induc-
tive statement of the human condition…” an error rooted in 
an uncritical assumption that Paul is “stating not only the 
truth of the gospel, but also the gospel truth” (Stowers 83). So 
foundational are these assumptions for gagnon that even when 
he does his exegetical homework and recognizes the genre and 
rhetorical moves that Paul makes, he ignores their implications. 
In doing so, he violates the intention of Paul’s argument. This is 
one of the great ironies that frequently emerge from an alleged 
insistence on locating the authority of scripture in what the 
Bible says. The reader becomes so obsessed with a few particular 
sentences or words that s/he misses the context entirely. One 
suspects that in situations like this the real authority actually 
lies in the reader since it is gagnon’s agenda that controls both 
the selection of the text and his reading of it. I am certainly not 
claiming a “virginal perception” for my own reading. I, too, 
have an agenda: advocacy for those marginalized by society. 
This is why I ask “Does my reading faithfully promote the mis-
sion of Christ? Is it life-giving or death-dealing? For whom?” 
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Endnotes
1. Pages 27-28 lists indicators of ascribed status in America as being 
male, white, able-bodied, heterosexual, Christian, and of the owning class.
2. Quotations are from Luther’s 1535 Lectures on Galatians as cited 
by Lotz p. 264.
3. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the details, but cf. 
the treatments of this subject in Martti nissinen, Homoeroticism in 
the Biblical World  (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1998) and also 
in Craig Williams, Roman Homosexuality: Ideologies of Masculinity in 
Classical Antiquity  (new york: Oxford UP, 1999).
4. Esler pp. 40-76 provides a fine treatment of ethnicity and ethnic 
conflict in the ancient Mediterranean world.
5. See also Witherington 58.
6. Later in Rom. 2:17-34 Paul will redefine genuine Judean status as 
being rooted inwardly in the heart rather than in the external signs and 
rites. See Esler p. 153.
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I LIVE In OHIO WHERE I teach religion and ethics. Ohio 
is one of the eleven states in the 2004 election that passed 
constitutional amendments effectively precluding any legal and 
civil recognition or institution of gay marriage. The passage of 
this state amendment dubbed colloquially as the “ban on gay 
marriage” generated much local controversy within my secular 
community, which has a considerable gay population, and much 
national controversy within the churches, including my own 
ELCA tradition. Locally and globally, the issue threatens to 
divide parish against parish, synod against synod, denomination 
against denomination, and perhaps most tragically as well as de 
facto, neighbor against neighbor.  
In a recent article, fellow Lutheran theologian Robert Benne 
cites gilbert Meilander’s claim that “One couldn’t support 
the revisionist agenda on biblical or confessional grounds; 
one would have to rely on social science and contemporary 
experience.”  Throughout the article, Benne expresses regret 
at the loss of what he terms “classical Lutheran teachings.”  
He references Wolfhart Pannenberg, who similarly opposes 
“attitudes [that are] oblivious to the gravity of treating the 
classical tradition as optional […]” (Benne 12). In response, as a 
prayerful progressive, I have begun to cast about for potential 
classical resources within my own tradition to address the issue. 
Is it accurate to claim that one cannot support gay marriage 
using resources from within the tradition, but instead one must 
uniquely use scientific and experiential resources from outside 
theological tradition?  How should Christians view the recent 
ban on gay marriage? To answer these questions and respond to 
Benne and others of like mind, I ask two questions of my own: 
(1) What does a theology of the cross mean for the twenty-
first century, particularly (but not exclusively) for Lutherans 
for whom it is a core concept? (2) What contributions does a 
twenty-first century understanding of the theology of the cross 
make to the contemporary conversation regarding gay marriage 
and its ban?   
It is my contention that a careful reading of Martin Luther’s 
classical notion of a theologia crucis—theology of the cross— 
provides us with theological support, grounded firmly in tradi-
tion and the gospel, for a convicted rejection of the ban on gay 
marriage. In Christian terms, the Defense of Marriage Act(s) are 
violations of agape and justice. In secular terms, the bans on gay 
marriage are selective discrimination, which is unconstitutional 
as a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Through medita-
tions on three of Luther’s Heidelberg disputation theses, I glean 
three corollary insights that will help prayerful Christians as 
they consider where to stand on the issue. Though I seek and use 
emphases within my own Lutheran tradition, I hope that my 
comments here will find resonance as well as encounter beyond 
denominational divides.  
First, what does a theology of the cross mean to those of us 
Christians living today?   The theologia crucis lies at the heart 
of both Lutheran theology and the Protestant Reformation. A 
theology of the cross, a term coined and developed by Martin 
Luther, reconsiders the importance of the crucified, suffering 
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Christ for our understanding of god, and acknowledges that 
“the crucified Christ is himself a challenge to Christian theol-
ogy” (Moltmann 3).  Luther felt that the Catholicism of his 
day allowed the triumphalism of the resurrection to eclipse the 
inscrutable shame and scandal of the cross. By emphasizing the 
importance of the cross for Christian theology, Luther hoped to 
correct what he considered an imbalanced, inordinate doctrinal 
emphasis on the glory of the resurrection. To better understand 
Luther’s project, imagine a balance, symbolizing both theology 
and the Christian attitude, with both the crucifixion and resur-
rection on either side. Luther felt that the preaching and action 
of the church (and therefore the attitudes of most Christians), 
tipped the scales fully in the direction of the resurrection. In 
the glory of Easter Sunday, in other words, the tragedy of good 
Friday was lost. 
Luther’s theology of the cross applies a corrective to this 
imbalance. Because the modern reader easily forgets the original 
historical context, however, the name tends to mislead. The 
theology of the cross has often been misinterpreted, for example, 
to mean that Christians should neglect or forget the resurrec-
tion and focus exclusively on the crucifixion. As Luther himself 
would say, by no means! Such a misinterpretation led and still 
leads to the resurrection-blind results of despair, fatalism, cyni-
cism, theological paralysis, and ethical quietism. Such readings 
have particularly upset feminists, who interpret Luther to be 
placing an inordinate emphasis upon redemptive suffering and 
a subsequent Christian need to accept illegitimate suffering and 
oppression. While I value these critiques, nonetheless Luther’s 
theological telos was to create a balance between these two cru-
cial christological ideas, not simply to recreate an imbalance in 
the other direction. 
Instead Luther, in my interpretation, urges Christians 
to leave behind such human either/or thinking and testify 
to a divine, scriptural “both-and” mode of understanding 
the gospel. The gospel scriptures assert that Christ was both 
crucified and resurrected; neither is to be understood without 
the other. We need to understand both ideas dialectically, an 
approach that is, incidentally, consistent with much of femi-
nist theory. Christians, therefore, must look at the world with 
a dual consciousness, holding the paradoxical “both-and” of 
crucifixion and resurrection before their hearts and minds as 
they theologize, interpret, and act in the world. For Luther, the 
Christian view is bifocal. In Luther’s epistemology, we are to 
understand god in both the scandal of the cross and the glory 
of the resurrection. However, the resurrection does not negate 
the cross’s scandal, nor does the cross negate the resurrection’s 
beauty. To the world (and often even to the church) this paradox 
has proved a difficult burden to bear, yet god calls us to do so. 
Thus, Luther’s theology of the cross should be understood as 
a methodology, not as a doctrine or dogma. It is a posture of 
faithfulness before both god and world. 
The theology of the cross does indeed help us conceive a 
response to one of the most important social issues of our day, 
gay marriage. Specifically, a theology of the cross provides three 
important insights, prompted by three of Luther’s remarks, 
which help us in our struggle to discern the will of god in such  
a difficult and divisive issue. 
MEDITATIoN 1: “A theology of glory calls evil good  
and good evil. A theology of the cross calls the thing 
what it actually is.” 
—Martin Luther, Heidelberg Disputation 53
First, a theology of the cross reveals a relevant cautionary 
reminder that human beings, particularly in the collective, 
possess an ugly and dangerous proclivity toward scapegoating. 
Human beings tend to call things by the wrong names. By nail-
ing Jesus to the cross, human beings, caught up in their glori-
ous preconceived notion of the messiah as a triumphant hero, 
effectively label Christ as evil, as a blasphemer and a rebel. Surely 
the real messiah would have triumphed over his enemies and not 
allowed himself to be mocked! Thinking thus, the people exe-
cuted Jesus, calling him a criminal. The theologian of the cross 
must testify to this truth, but also simultaneously to the truth 
of the resurrection. The resurrection revealed that Jesus was the 
son of god, sinless and pure, the quintessence of goodness. yet 
human beings, without exception (except for a pagan!), mistak-
enly called Jesus “evil.” Rather than humiliating human persons 
with this knowledge, god in an act of radical grace freely chose 
to allow all human beings to acquire Jesus’s “alien righteousness” 
as their own, “The love of god does not find, but creates, that 
which is pleasing to it” (Luther 41). While the crucifixion reveals 
human sinfulness, the resurrection reveals god’s gracefulness. A 
theology of the cross reminds us that instead of acknowledging 
our own guilt and blame, we human beings tend to deflect our 
own guilt on to someone else, someone who is innocent of the 
particular crime with which they are charged.  
no doubt many might ask, what can this rhetoric possibly 
have to do with homosexuals?  Homosexuals are sinful, and 
therefore must in no way be compared to our sinless Lord Jesus 
Christ!  To which I respond yes, homosexuals are sinful, as are 
all human beings, gay or straight. Calling things by their right 
names, a theology of the cross reveals that no one is guiltless 
and proclaims with the apostle Paul, “For all have sinned and 
fall short of the glory of god” (Rom. 3:23).  While Christ alone 
was innocent of all charges of sin, human beings are all guilty of 
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some sin or another in the eyes of god. However, not all human 
beings are guilty of the particular crime with which they are 
charged. For example, Jews during the nazi regime were charged 
with being “enemies of the state,” in spite of the fact that Jews 
in no way posed a threat to the state and were indeed less than 
2% of the population. The Holocaust is indeed one of the prime 
historical examples of our horrifying tendency toward unjusti-
fied scapegoating. Christians and their antisemitism played an 
enormous role in this scapegoating. Christians persecuted Jews 
for centuries in Europe because of their reading of scripture: 
Jews were Christ-killers, plain and simple. In the wake of the 
Holocaust, the Lutheran church took responsibility for the 
church and Luther’s antisemitism and issued a formal apology 
to our Jewish brothers and sisters. The Roman Catholic Church 
also issued a formal apology in Vatican II. The urgent ques-
tion facing us today is: fifty years from now, will the church be 
ashamed of its current position toward homosexuality and gay 
marriage, as we have been ashamed before? 
notably, the Third Reich also charged homosexuals with 
being enemies of the state as they were an assault on the founda-
tion of german society, the family. Over 100,000 homosexu-
als were persecuted, tortured, and/or murdered during the 
Holocaust. Does knowledge of historical discrimination against 
homosexuals make a difference in our minds about contem-
porary laws concerning homosexuals? Sadly, less than 25% of 
Americans today are aware of the fact that homosexuals were 
even victims in any way of the nazis. If they had known, would 
it have made a difference at the polls on election day? A defini-
tive answer to this question is not possible, though it should 
highlight for thoughtful Christians the dreadful potential for 
condemnation (labeling a group as “evil”) to lead to active per-
secution. As is well known in the cases of people like Matthew 
Shepherd, homosexuals in our own country are often the 
victims of persecution, violence, and hate crimes. In the current 
American political arena, homosexuals are “charged” with “cor-
rupting or destroying the sanctity of marriage.”  According to 
this logic, laws are needed to protect marriage. Hence in Ohio, 
our state legislature passed a law called the Defense of Marriage 
Act, an act whose very name implies that marriage needs to be 
defended from those who would otherwise destroy it without 
our preventive measures. The assumption is, of course, that mar-
riage needs to be defended against homosexuals; hence “Issue 
1” on the Ohio ballot was referred to by every form of media as 
“the ban on gay marriage.”  Are gays and lesbians indeed guilty 
as charged?
Here, the theology of the cross as methodology begs me to 
ask the question, could this accusation against homosexuals be 
yet another manifestation of the Christian complicity in and 
human tendency toward unjustified scapegoating?  Could this 
condemnation of homosexuals as the source of the corruption of 
marriage be a classic case of the egregiously mistaken human ten-
dency to call the good evil and the evil good, at least in part? Both 
at the level of intentionality and action, I cannot find any empirical 
evidence that gay marriage destroys the sanctity of marriage. 
And what of scriptural evidence? Though an in-depth bibli-
cal study is beyond the scope of this essay, in all seven references 
to what contemporary readers term homosexuality, the Bible 
speaks only of same-sex acts, never of sexual orientation let alone 
gay marriage, a possibility never entertained by the biblical writ-
ers. The Bible does speak negatively of same-sex acts, referring 
to them as unnatural. Is it then the unnaturalness of certain 
sex-acts that corrupts marriage?  What constitutes an unnatural 
sex-act?  Anal sex? What of oral sex? Do American Christians 
consider these acts are unnatural? Is it then that particular sex-
acts corrupt marriage? But what of the gay couples who perform 
none of these “unnatural” sex-acts (and yes, there are plenty of 
people who fall into this category)? Aren’t heterosexual couples 
who engage in “unnatural” sex-acts like oral sex destroying the 
sanctity of marriage?  If so, countless people, including innumer-
able Christians, stand indicted. Where are the additional laws 
needed to protect marriage from these sorts of attacks from 
within?  Why can heterosexuals engage in all these “corrup-
tions” of marriage and more, with impunity? Are heterosexual 
marriages permitted because they are sinless, and homosexual 
marriages prohibited because they are sinful? What straight 
Christian could claim before god that their marriage is sinless? 
Do heterosexuals bear no blame at all for the crumbling of 
marriage in America?  I fear that the scapegoating of homosex-
uals for marriage’s corruption can lead American heterosexual 
Christians down this path of no accountability, to a theology 
of righteousness which bears no resemblance to a theology of 
the cross. Jesus, after all, in the book of Matthew, suggests that 
divorce —not homosexuality, which Jesus never condemns—is 
an assault on the sanctity of marriage. Mark 10:11: “He 
answered, ‘Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another 
woman commits adultery against her. And if she divorces her 
husband and marries another man, she commits adultery.’”  
Jesus could not have been more correct in labeling that which 
indisputably corrupts the sanctity of marriage: marriage’s 
dissolution. Sanctity means holy or sacred, religiously binding, 
and inviolable. Christian divorce violates the inviolable, tear-
ing apart with human hands and deeds what god has bound 
together. Jesus’s assertion has the added flourish of being both 
rationally and empirically verifiable—surely the tragic death of 
every marriage is an assault on marriage’s supposed inviolabil-
ity and sanctity. 
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As a heterosexual theologian of the cross, I feel compelled to 
call things by their right names. To use Luther’s terms of good 
and evil, divorce is evil, if by evil we mean that which destroys 
marriage. The legalization of divorce in this country goes directly 
against the very words uttered by the lips of our Lord. However, 
most churches, innumerable Christians, and the American legal 
system have determined (I think understandably) that divorce 
is, at times, a necessary evil, a last resort. yet where is the moral 
outrage over such legalization?  Divorce is for many, a regrettable 
exception to the norm. For many thoughtful Christians, divorce is 
an exception grounded in the reality and inescapability of human 
sinfulness. For still others, however, divorce is simply a no-fault 
agreement. Some heterosexuals marry three, four, even five times 
in a lifetime, in clear violation of the Ohio state constitutional 
amendment that states, “Only a union between one man and one 
woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state and 
its political subdivisions.”  In practice, the state clearly recognizes 
not one, but multiple successive marriages for heterosexuals as 
valid. Why aren’t Christians concerned about the fact that there 
is absolutely no limit on the serial monogamy of heterosexuals, 
who could feasibly be married and remarried twenty times in one 
lifetime, while living in one state? The “gay marriage ban” isolates 
homosexuals as the only persons who are both unmarriageable 
and corruptors of marriage’s sanctity.
Divorce, however, fortunately can and never will be 
prescriptive for Christians. We do not wish for all to be 
divorced. Similarly, gay marriage can never be prescriptive, 
in the sense that prayerful progressives do not wish for all 
marriages to be gay unions. Many prayerful progressives 
are not arguing for homosexuality to become universal 
behavior—any more than they are pushing for divorce to 
be universal. Prayerful progressives’ arguments must not 
be summarized with this straw-man fallacy. no, prayerful 
progressives like myself are pointing to a double standard 
that may very well rely on a theology of glory—the naïve 
triumphalism of heterosexual Christians that they have 
successfully sustained the sanctity of marriage, despite all 
evidence to the contrary. Prayerful theologians of the cross 
might ask the question, can the Christian church conceive 
of homosexuality as a legal exception to the Christian norm, 
just like divorce?  That is, acceptable and even celebrated 
by some who consider it sinless, regrettable to others who 
consider it sinful but acceptable as a necessary evil because 
of the omnipresence of human sinfulness—but however you 
slice it, perfectly legal?  no good reason why this compro-
mise is not possible, particularly from the standpoint of 
justice, has been presented. As things currently stand, many 
might appositely accuse Christians of inconsistency, pushing 
as they have for laws ostensibly honoring one part of the 
biblical text (homosexuality) while completely conceding to 
secular values on the other (divorce). The prayerful progres-
sive position advocates with consistency for acceptance of 
both exceptions.
MEDITATIoN 2: “Although the works of man always 
seem attractive and good, they are nevertheless likely to 
be mortal sins….Without the theology of the cross, men 
misuse the best in the worst manner.” 
—Martin Luther, Heidelberg Disputation 43,55
The second insight the theology of the cross grants to the 
Christian struggling to take a stand on the issue of gay marriage 
is the notion that our epistemologies are deeply wounded. At our 
very best, without exception, an authentic consideration of the 
crucifixion demands that we recognize that we employ scarred 
epistemologies. What does this mean?  To answer, we must also 
discuss the theological anthropology suggested by a theology of 
the cross. In effect we must answer two questions here: Who are 
human beings, and how does this affect what we know? 
According to Luther, Christians are embodied paradoxes. 
That is to say, looking at the world through the bifocal lens of 
the crucifixion and resurrection shows us that human beings 
are simul justus et peccator. This Latin phrase means that all 
Christians who truly understand the gospel and the theology of 
the cross understand themselves in a strange manner—that is, as 
persons who are simultaneously righteous and sinful. Christians 
are justified sinners, righteous sinners, rendered righteous not 
by a single word or deed of their own but instead only through 
the righteousness of Christ. “It is the sweetest righteousness 
of god the Father that he does not save imaginary, but rather, 
real sinners, sustaining us in spite of our sins and accepting our 
works and our lives which are all deserving of rejection, until he 
perfects and saves us […] we […] escape his judgment through his 
mercy, not through our righteousness” (Luther 63).  
Luther urges us to understand that human beings’ existence 
as simul justus et peccator dramatically affects both our knowl-
edge and our actions. This calls for a radical reversal in human 
thinking, which typically feels more comfortable in a theology 
of glory, because it permits the fanciful notion that some indi-
viduals stand on a pure and moral high ground. Instead, Luther’s 
theology of the cross suggests that neither can be without 
ambiguity. To make this point abundantly clear, Luther quotes 
Eccles. 7:20, “Surely there is not a righteous man on earth who 
does good and never sins,” and Ps. 143:2, “no man living is righ-
teous before thee.” no thought, understanding, belief, action, 
or institution is ever untainted by human sin. Sin permeates all, 
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even Christians, churches, marriage, and biblical interpreta-
tions. Thus in Moltmann’s terms, for Luther, Christ “is a scandal 
even for Christian theology” (Moltmann 3).      
In the realm of epistemology, sin’s ubiquity suggests that no 
human being can claim full knowledge of god’s will. A theology 
of the cross simultaneously testifies to our deep intimacy and  
connectedness with god but also to our radical disconnection and 
alienation from god. It is not one or the other, but always both. 
Practically, this means whether I am a progressive or a conserva-
tive, indeed whatever my position, a theology of the cross neces-
sitates that I adopt a position of self-critique. Luther reminds us, 
“Arrogance cannot be avoided or true hope be present unless the 
judgment of condemnation is feared in every work” (Luther 48). 
In shorthand, a theology of the cross urges us to ask about even 
our noblest enterprises such as ethical decision-making: Could I 
be wrong?  no one can corner the market on god’s will and truth. 
A theology of the cross introduces the scary truth of fallibility, 
stated scripturally in Romans as “all have sinned and fall short of 
the glory of god” (Rom. 3:23). On this issue, scripture is surpris-
ingly unambiguous, “For god has imprisoned all in disobedience 
so that he may be merciful to all” (Rom. 11:32).  
no doubt many of my fellow Christians will counter that 
the will of god is clear and unambiguous and is preserved in 
the word of god. If the Bible were without ambiguity, however, 
Christians would not be plagued with these discussions. As 
only one case in point, while the Bible says thou shalt not kill, 
it also admonishes the chosen people of god to slaughter the 
Canaanites without mercy in warfare. Such is the basis of our 
current debates on war. Similarly, though some biblical passages 
condemn same-sex acts, particularly in the Old Testament, other 
biblical passages seem potentially to trump this injunction--
for example, gal. 3:28: “There is neither Jew nor greek, slave 
nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus,” 
to which we could conceivably add “gay and straight.”  In the 
midst of this ambiguity, a theology of the cross reminds us of 
the difficult truth that even biblical interpretation, tainted as it 
is by human sin like every other human endeavor, is and can be 
guided by human agendas rather than divine ones.  
Vast historical evidence corroborates this insight. Christian 
pastors and parishioners, for example, used their skewed reading 
of the Christian Bible as their primary source for supporting 
slavery. The Bible appears to support slavery, yet no American 
Christian supports this interpretation today. We consistently 
reinterpret the Bible in light of our culture, but many act as if we 
are just doing this for the first time in the case of homosexual-
ity. A more recent and perhaps relevant example occurred in 
1998 in South Carolina, where state legislators realized that a 
law banning interracial marriage was still on the books. At that 
time, a Christian senator stood up on the senate floor and stated 
that based on his Christian beliefs and the Bible, he believed 
interracial marriages were an abomination to god and man. 
Our laws obviously once shared this senator’s viewpoint that 
miscegenation was a corruption of marriage’s sanctity. However, 
since 1967, state interracial marriage bans have been declared 
unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. (This raises 
the question: why does race qualify under the equal protec-
tion clause but not sexuality?)  A majority of Christians once 
shared this senator’s views as well, though now they no longer 
do. Clearly these former “Christian” positions were guided by 
human agendas and not divine ones, but very few people real-
ized this at the time. A theology of the cross, however, reminds 
us all that such interpretations are likely. Could the same human 
agendas of prejudice be at stake in the gay marriage debate over 
reinterpretation of scripture? given my understanding of our 
scarred epistemologies, I cannot and do not claim absolute truth 
for my position. Instead, I respectfully offer it up to thoughtful 
Christians, especially within the ELCA, for their consideration 
as a countervoice to the mainstream.  
A theology of the cross therefore reminds of our beautiful 
need of one another, what I term our dialogical need of the other. 
A theology of the cross suggests that human beings need one 
another, to call one another up short and help us to discern the 
log in our own eye to which we are blind, busy as we are finding 
the sty in everyone else’s. In our blindness, only god, working 
through our neighbors and their agape, can help. The point of 
such difficult discussions is not to claim that nothing can be 
said, but for Christians to enter into dialogue about their inter-
pretations, serving as necessary critics of one another with those 
on the opposite side of the spectrum.  
Sin, therefore, is a great equalizer. But perhaps you are asking, 
are Christians then completely unable to make absolute truth 
claims, left with nothing but relativism?  A theology of the cross 
suggests that we can and must still speak, yet we must confess 
that our claims are provisional. Undoubtedly this thought 
makes many people uncomfortable, and they would see such a 
claim as a curse and a sell-out. I can only remind these dialogue 
partners that on good Friday, we condemned Christ as a crimi-
nal and blasphemer. Even his own disciples betrayed, denied, 
and abandoned him. Thankfully, however, we have a forgiving 
god. On the basis of grace, god overturned our judgment of 
Christ and instead passed his own. god’s judgment, impor-
tantly, did not resemble our own in the slightest, but instead was 
its opposite. A theology of the cross reminds me that only god 
judges (crucifixion) and only god saves and redeems (resurrec-
tion). nothing that human beings do or say or even believe earns 
them salvation—only a theology of glory would believe such a 
thing. Says Luther, “The person who believes that he can obtain 
grace by doing what is in him adds sin to sin so that he becomes 
doubly guilty” (Luther 50).  
The concept of being saved by grace lies at the core of 
Lutheran teaching, and with Luther, I believe it is a relief that I 
am not saved by my own merit or my own judgments. I therefore 
interpret the provisionality of human truth claims to be a bless-
ing, and not a curse. Such knowledge of provisionality leaves 
room for the Holy Spirit to work in the world and for god to be 
alive and sovereign, working through and in human beings to 
provide human life with future revelation of godself. The pro-
visionality of human truth claims, even moral and theological 
ones, leaves room for the resurrection to happen. If human labels 
and judgments were definitive, there would be no Resurrection, 
and no resurrections. In the face of god, I cannot claim absolute 
knowledge. I can only speak and act as the Spirit guides me, and 
as a theologian of the cross that means with deep humility and 
consciousness of my own fallibility. 
Even though we will undoubtedly err in our biblical interpre-
tations and subsequent social ethics, my principle of selectivity 
is the scriptural Christ-given principle of 
agape found in Mark 12:31: “‘Love your 
neighbor as yourself.’ There is no com-
mandment greater than these.”  When 
faced with ambiguity as in the situation of homosexuality, I 
choose as a theologian of the cross to err on the side of agape, 
understanding that if god’s judgment one day proves me wrong 
(crucifixion,) we also have a loving and forgiving god (resur-
rection.)  As contemporary Christians, we must confess our 
principles of selectivity as well as our selective literalism. After 
all, how many of us stone children to death when they curse 
their parents, as Exod. 21:17 commands?  How many of us do 
as Christ instructed in Mark 10:21 and sell all that we have and 
give it to the poor?   
Wherever selective literalism is unconfessed and unacknowl-
edged, as it commonly is in contemporary discussions of gay 
marriage, a theology of the cross cautions that a human preju-
dicial agenda could be at work. A theology of the cross implies 
that god’s justice compels me to also act for justice in the world. 
From the standpoint of justice toward homosexuals, I must ask, 
on what possible biblical basis can we ban exclusively homosexu-
als from the civil institution of marriage?  As things currently 
stand, they are the only consenting adults not permitted to 
marry by law. But scripturally, are those who commit same-sex 
acts the only “sinners”?  Surely not! What of murderers?  Can 
they marry? The answer is yes, in every state, even if they are 
behind bars.1 What of other biblical sinners of a more sexual 
nature, such as adulterers, can they marry?  Can rapists marry? 
Can child molesters and abusers get married, and therefore have 
children?  Can persons convicted of domestic violence against a 
spouse marry?  Clearly adulterers, rapists, child molesters, and 
spousal-abusers undeniably violate the sanctity of marriage; 
what sane person would argue otherwise? But can all of these 
persons (criminals, actually) legally marry?  yes, yes, yes, and 
yes. As long as one is heterosexual in America and a consenting 
adult, marriage is yours for the taking, and abusing.  
As a theologian of the cross who calls things by their right 
names, when I look at the current legislation banning same-sex 
marriage, I can think only of Martin Luther king Jr.’s defini-
tion of an unjust law. In the Letter from Birmingham Jail, 
king defines an unjust law as “a code that a numerical or power 
majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not 
make binding on itself. This is difference made legal” (king 
430). Letter for letter, the current gay marriage ban qualifies as 
an unjust law according to Dr. king. My conscience therefore 
condemns the gay-marriage ban with my very being, as there is 
no denying that it is a law passed by a power majority group on 
a minority group which is not binding for itself. Far be it from 
us as Christians to support injustice, analogous to the way many 
Americans Christians were blind to the injustice of race rela-
tions for decades. As an American citizen, I can only think of 
our legal system, which deems unconstitutional any and all laws 
that target only one specific group and deny them equal rights. 
Both a theology of the cross and the Constitution condemn acts 
of discrimination. Martin Luther and his namesake Dr. king 
stand united on this issue. Justice is the concern of theology and 
of Christians just as surely as it is the concern of every American 
citizen. I ask myself, how could such a violation of justice have 
passed, primarily with the support of Christians who claim to 
seek justice?2
The gay marriage ban therefore does just what it purports 
to do: exclusively targets homosexuals and stigmatizes them as 
unworthy of marriage. In supporting such a ban, the Christian 
churches participate in injustice, albeit perhaps unwittingly 
and in the very name of justice—but the theology of the cross 
forewarns us of such irony. By supporting this ban, the churches 
tacitly ignore other marital issues in which one person would 
concede that they are hurt by the other—spousal abuse and rape, 
child molestation, and adultery. (notably, in gay unions, both 
parties claim not only to not be hurt, but to flourish.) What 
kind of message do we send to our young people by isolating our 
marital laws and our support of such laws to homosexuality?  We 
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send the message that as the body of Christ, we do not condemn 
rape, adultery, domestic violence, murder and child abuse as 
corruptions of marriage. Only being gay matters; only homo-
sexuality corrupts marital covenants. Have we unreasonably 
isolated a “sin” that is easy to categorize as “other”—the “sin” 
of being gay—in order to protect ourselves and our presumed 
righteousness?  Are we afraid to condemn behaviors that are 
not conveniently isolatable to a group to which most of us do 
not belong? After all, homosexuality is not a behavior which 
tempts heterosexuals; behaviors such as anger, mistreatment of 
our spouse and adultery, on the other hand, are real temptations 
for all of us. If we condemn these too loudly, are we afraid of 
condemning ourselves? A theologian of the cross must wonder 
here if a theology of glory is at work. When will we at last call 
things by their right names?
MEDITATIoN 3: “That person does not deserve to be 
called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things 
of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those 
things which have actually happened.”  
—Martin Luther, Heidelberg Disputation 52
The third and final insight offered by a theology of the cross 
regards god. Because god cannot be fully known by us, this sec-
tion is of necessity the shortest of my three sections, yet perhaps 
most noteworthy. We human beings ask, who is god?  And a the-
ology of the cross answers: god is Immanuel, that is, god with us. 
For Luther, the strangeness of the gospel tale lies primarily in the 
fact that god was present in such a humiliating place such as the 
cross. He writes, “now it is not sufficient for anyone, and it does 
him no good to recognize god in his glory and majesty, unless he 
recognizes him in the humility and shame of the cross. Thus god 
destroys the wisdom of the wise, as Isaiah 45:15 says, ‘Truly, thou 
art a god who hidest thyself ’” (Luther 52-53). 
The incarnation and crucifixion imply, therefore, that god 
can be found anywhere—absolutely anywhere. This insight, 
Luther well recognized, is simultaneously scandalous and beau-
tiful. On the one hand, it means that no place is so remote that 
god is not present. In suffering, death, grief, radical doubt, and 
even murder, god—Immanuel—is there. On the other hand, 
this insight means that human beings cannot discern, let alone 
limit where god’s grace is at work and where it is not. Indeed, a 
theology of the cross states that the work of god’s grace is invis-
ible to the human eye and therefore can be seen only with the 
eyes of faith which hopes in things unseen. 
A theology of the cross also reveals that god judges and con-
demns (crucifixion) and saves and redeems (resurrection.)  god is 
both judge and redeemer; human beings are ultimately neither for 
they tend to misjudge and have no power to redeem. All human 
institutions and endeavors thus stand under both god’s judgment 
and god’s redemption. Because we cannot think the resurrection 
without the cross, however, we are reminded that the redemption 
of the world is proleptic and paradoxical. That is, it is already but 
not yet. Until the eschaton, god uses the raw materials of this 
world, including human beings, as vehicles of his grace and justice. 
Who is responsible for sanctifying a marriage?  According 
to Luther and a theology of the cross, god alone sanctifies 
marriage. Human beings and their actions cannot sanctify or 
bless their own marriages. This gives new meaning to Matt. 
19:6, “What therefore god has joined together, let no man put 
asunder.” A theology of the cross insists that human beings 
cannot domesticate god and limit god’s sovereignty or work-
ings of grace in any way. Marriage, in the sacramental view 
of most churches, can function as a vehicle of god’s grace to 
human beings, should god choose to bless the marriage in this 
way. That being said, do heterosexual Christians dare to have the 
audacity to claim that god cannot and will not ever choose to 
use gay marriage and love to extend his grace to human beings?  
Who are we to limit god in such a way? Who are we to limit the 
possibility of grace in advance for other human beings through 
our laws?  Can we say that god cannot join together homo-
sexuals? A theology of the cross cautions against such human 
domestication of god’s sovereignty, particularly because human 
beings, given the choice, would certainly have denied that god 
could use the scandal of a criminal’s execution on the cross to 
work his grace on the entire world. god’s logic is not our logic. A 
theology of the cross reveals that considering the two conflat-
able is pure folly. In the words of C.S. Lewis, god is the great 
iconoclast. This must not be forgotten.
In conclusion, my essay disproves the claim that one has to rely 
exclusively on social science and contemporary experience and 
not the Lutheran tradition in order to argue for the acceptance 
of gay marriage. Using the theology of the cross, an idea that lies 
at the heart of the Lutheran tradition, I have shown an alterna-
tive interpretation of the issue. Before god, I assert my theology 
and resulting social ethic with great fear and trembling, in the 
knowledge that my epistemology is scarred. Before god, I cannot 
claim to know if my own position is sinful or just, though like 
all human endeavors according to a theology of the cross, it is 
probably an admixture of both. If my dialogue partners cannot 
confess the same of their own positions, have they truly heard 
the message of the cross?  Before human beings, I must confess 
that my conscience convinces me that anti-homosexualism is the 
last acceptable prejudice in this country. That homosexuals are 
humiliated on a daily basis and stigmatized as being the only seg-
ment of our society unworthy of the blessings of marriage, of this 
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there is no doubt. While some would argue that this humiliation 
is well deserved and brought on by choice and by guilt, I cannot 
avoid considering the alternative possibility that this humiliation 
is brought on by scapegoating and unconfessed human agendas 
of political self-interest and spiritual self-righteousness. In this 
regard I ask to be heard, and invite responses. I close by encourag-
ing my fellow Christians, whatever their views, to remember that 
the authentic desire to discern god’s will for the people of god 
provides a common ground all Christians, be they “prayerful pro-
gressives” or “compassionate conservatives.” Where this insight is 
lost, no authentic dialogue is possible.
Endnotes
1. notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in Turner vs Safley ruled in 
1987 that prisoners were allowed to get married, citing marriage as a 
fundamental civil right (Turner).
2. no doubt at this point many protest that under this reasoning, 
polygamy, too, should be permitted. For surely the defense of marriage 
acts also discriminate against those minority groups who seek polyg-
amy. To this rebuttal, I have two brief responses. First, I can only point 
out that those who seek polygamy have a strong scriptural basis for 
their actions—i.e. models of the faith such as Abraham had multiple 
wives. This of course only proves my point that everyone, whether they 
confess it or not, consistently interpret the Bible selectively according 
to their own community and standards. Second, however, polygamy is 
to be rejected by Christians because it is inherently discriminatory and 
a violation of justice. Polygamy, it should be noted, also qualifies for an 
unjust law using Dr. king’s definition. Those who seek polygamy mean 
by the term both in concept and in praxis the practice of having mul-
tiple wives. At no time do they mean the practice of having multiple 
husbands (for which there is no scriptural precedent.) While many 
men would love to have multiple wives, how many of those same men 
would be willing to share their wife with countless other men? Men 
who seek polygamy have no intention of sharing such privileges with 
women. Again I can only quote the Christian minister Dr. king, this is 
difference made legal.
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THE CHURCHWIDE ASSEMBLy of the ELCA took on 
some tough sexuality issues during its August 2005 meeting 
in Orland, Florida. It voted to continue under the guidance 
of the 1993 Bishop’s Statement that there were no grounds in 
scripture or tradition for blessing gay or lesbian unions, but at 
the same time it refused to provide for the discipline of those 
who ignored that guidance. A narrow majority voted down 
the provision for the ordination of partnered gays and lesbians 
through an exceptional process. However, such a provision 
would have required a two-thirds majority since it would have 
meant constitutional changes.
The preassembly Sexuality Task Force and Church Council 
ducked the normative question that has to be answered by the 
newly constituted Task Force: are there adequate biblical and 
theological grounds for lifting the age-old and near-universal 
Christian proscription of homosexual conduct, even if it occurs 
in committed same-sex pairs?  The clear answer to that question 
may lead to a church split, especially if the ELCA answers the 
question affirmatively.
The question before us is this: Would the active involvement 
of college and university faculties in this possibly church-divid-
ing conflict be helpful?  What I would hope for in answering 
that question is far different from what I think would happen.
What I would hope for goes something like this: I would 
hope for a balanced mixture of what James Davison Hunter 
calls the “orthodox” and “progressive” perspectives among the 
faculty of the religion and social science departments on the 
issues being dealt with by the ELCA. (By “progressive” Hunter 
means those who believe we ought to revise or reject central 
tenets of received moral tradition according to the enlightened 
opinion of the day, informed as it is by contemporary experi-
ence and practice. On the other hand, the “orthodox” believe 
that these central tenets are settled moral truths that have been 
revealed in the tradition and therefore cannot be compromised 
by even the most enlightened opinion of the day.)  Between 
those poles would be a segment of the faculty who would 
occupy a middle ground on these contested sexuality issues.
given this sort of balance, the Lutheran colleges could actu-
ally model fair discourse on something as volatile as the subject 
of homosexuality. Theological ethicists from both sides would 
be invited to make their best arguments, realizing that a moral 
tradition of two thousand year duration and of near universal 
acceptance among the major Christian churches would need 
overwhelming arguments and evidence against it to call it into 
serious question. In other words, traditional moral teaching would 
be given the benefit of the doubt and treated with high respect.
The social sciences would evenhandedly marshal the huge 
amount of new research on marriage, divorce, gay and lesbian 
unions, cohabitation, sexual abuse, and family life. Where our 
culture is heading on these issues would be presented from 
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various ideological perspectives, but there would be a search for 
reliable empirical material that all sides would consider accurate. 
The many other disciplines could enter the conversation from 
their perspectives. And, of course, students would be invited to 
listen in and participate in appropriate ways.
Perhaps the conversation would not—and maybe should 
not—lead to a definitive conclusion. But such fair moral dis-
course could be funneled into the larger church discussion in 
the many ways already provided by the ELCA. Perhaps colleges 
could publish articles and books on these issues similar to what 
the seminaries did.
That is my idyllic expectation of how a Lutheran college 
faculty might carry on fair moral discourse. But such a marvel-
ous thing is not likely to happen because the preponderance of 
“progressives” in the academy is so large that real moral discourse 
would be nearly impossible. That majority, reflecting American 
elite opinion in general, is so hefty that its opinions have often 
taken on the characteristics of unchallengeable truths. These 
“truths” are so deeply assumed by the majority that they no 
longer need to be argued; any intelligent person of good will 
would hold them. Those who depart from that alleged consensus 
are then considered to be neither intelligent nor goodwilled. 
Indeed, the “dissenters” are then often met with derision while 
those of the majority opinion are cheered on, sometimes literally 
so. Such an atmosphere tends to intimidate minority opinion 
and squelch debate.
I have much anecdotal evidence for the truth of such an 
analysis since I have been often in the minority in the academy 
and elite levels of the church on sexuality issues, as well as on 
political and other cultural issues. However, it is easy to move to 
other contexts where the deep-running assumptions are just the 
opposite. neither situation makes for good debate. The academy, 
however, is definitely in the hands of the “progressives.”
The famous research by klein, Stern, and Western1 indicates 
a ratio of more than ten to one in favor of liberals over conserva-
tives in six nationwide social science and humanities associa-
tions. Political and cultural liberalism are not exactly correlated 
but there are some pretty strong convergences. Earlier studies 
done on Lutheran colleges suggest that they are more liberal 
than other private colleges. My hunch is that few Lutheran 
colleges would have a healthy balance between “orthodox” and 
“progressive” faculty on these hot-button sexuality issues. The 
imbalance would be sufficient to make debate very difficult. 
The great majority would wade in on the “progressive” side and 
merely reinforce the already progressive views of the seminaries 
and the national level of the ELCA.
Of course, if you believe that the “progressives” have the right 
“take” on this matter you might cheer this kind of contribution 
on the part of the colleges and universities. But such a one-sided 
contribution would not help the ELCA come to a careful judg-
ment that both respects the great Tradition and the challenges 
presented by the modern world.
But hold on. It would be possible to gather a fair balance of 
perspectives from across the colleges and universities that could 
indeed enrich this weighty debate. However, it would take 
the wisdom of Solomon and the courage of St. Paul to do the 
selection and the gathering. Thus far the ELCA has not been 
able to gather the proper balance for such fair moral discourse. 
Maybe the colleges and universities could actually pull off such 
a gathering. But who would do the selecting, the gathering, and 
the hosting?
End Note
1. For a summary of the findings see “national Survey Finds 
Academe Politically Imbalanced.” NAS Update 14.2 (2005): 9. The 
fuller study is published as Daniel B. klein, Charlotta Stern, and 
Andrew Western, “Documenting the One-Party Campus,” Academic 
Questions Winter (2004-2005): 40-52.
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Augsburg College  |  minneapolis, minnesota    
Augustana College  |  rock island, illinois
Augustana College  |  sioux falls, south dakota
Bethany College  |  lindsborg, kansas
California Lutheran University  |  thousand oaks, california
Capital University  |  columbus, ohio
Carthage College  |  kenosha, wisconsin
Concordia College  |  moorhead,  minnesota
Dana College  |  blair, nebraska
Finlandia University  |  hancock, michigan
gettysburg College  |  gettysburg, pennsylvania
grand View College  |  des moines, iowa
gustavus Adolphus College  |  st. peter, minnesota
Lenoir-Rhyne College  |  hickory, north carolina
Luther College  |  decorah, iowa
Midland Lutheran College  |  fremont, nebraska
Muhlenberg College  |  allentown, pennsylvania
newberry College  |  newberry, south carolina
Pacific Lutheran University  |  tacoma, washington
Roanoke College  |  salem, virginia
St. Olaf College  |  northfield, minnesota
Susquehanna University  | selinsgrove, pennsylvania
Texas Lutheran University  |  seguin, texas
Thiel College  |  greenville, pennsylvania
Wagner College  |  staten island, new york
Wartburg College  |  waverly, iowa
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